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THE PROSECUTION OF MICHAEL VICK:
OF DOGFIGHTING, DEPRAVITY, DUAL
SOVEREIGNTY, AND “A CLOCKWORK
ORANGE”
ADAM HARRIS KURLAND
INTRODUCTION
The passage of time often provides the necessary perspective to evaluate
how an event has actually influenced the legal landscape. Viewed some years
later, the actual impact often differs quite markedly from the instant
―conventional wisdom‖ articulated in its immediate aftermath.
This has long been the case. For example, in the immediate aftermath of
the presidential election of 1928, with the landslide victory of Herbert Hoover
and the election of huge ―dry‖ majorities in both houses of Congress, few at
the time predicted that Prohibition would be gone—constitutionally eliminated
from the Constitution—just five years later.1 Moreover, even fewer could
have predicted that the prohibition experience, in one sense a profound failure
of the expansion of federal criminal law enforcement, nevertheless would
spawn a myriad of legal doctrines critical to the modern expansion of federal
criminal law and procedure.2
On a far more modest scale, the federal prosecution of Michael Vick
(Vick) on dogfighting related charges in 2007 was, at the time, seen by some
as marking a critical turning point in the federal government‘s recognition of
dogfighting as a significant federal prosecutorial priority, as well as a
significant benchmark for the animal rights community in its conscienceraising quest regarding the value of canine life.3
 Adam Harris Kurland is a Professor of Law at Howard University School of Law. He would
like to thank Amanda Maldonado, Howard University School of Law, J.D. 2010, and Ashley Joyner,
Howard University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2012, for their research assistance. He would also
like to thank Howard University School of Law for its financial support. The views expressed herein
are solely those of the author, who takes all responsibility for any errors or omissions.
1. Prohibition was repealed by the Twenty-Third Amendment in December 1933. For a thorough
discussion, see DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION (2010).
2. See KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINES: THE FORGOTTEN
INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION (1994) (discussing lasting effects of Prohibition era doctrines
on federal criminal law and procedure).
3. Diane M. Sullivan et al., A Modest Proposal for Advancing Animal Rights, 71 ALB. L. REV.

KURLAND (DO NOT DELETE)

466

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

7/15/2011 10:23 AM

[Vol. 21:2

However, with the passage of only a few years time, some of the lasting
lessons of the Vick prosecution have emerged. The lessons are complex and
somewhat unflattering and are not necessarily the lessons that many thought
would be the case‘s enduring legacy.
Vick‘s conduct was depraved and deserving of punishment. Largely
because of the gruesome images of dog torture associated with his conduct, to
many, Vick remains, to many, a particularly unsympathetic figure.
Nonetheless, the Vick case raises a number of troubling questions concerning
the criminal justice process. A detailed critical analysis of the relevant
substantive and procedural issues is necessary.4
Far from being the impetus for the federal government‘s new and
prolonged focus on the ills of dogfighting, the Vick case stands, at best, as an
outlier case and, at worst, as a strange example of the misuse of federal power.
The prosecution of Vick became oppressively exceptional when local Virginia
prosecutors belatedly brought additional state felony charges after the
successful federal prosecution. Both prosecutorial entities engaged in weird,
and somewhat disingenuous, legal gymnastics in determining what charges to
pursue and ultimately accept through guilty pleas in order to resolve the
respective prosecutions. As such, the Vick case exemplifies the misuse of
both state and federal prosecutorial discretion—hardly a model to emulate in
the future. This is particularly sobering in light of the fact that the federalstate jurisdictional overlap continues to expand, and successive prosecutions,
while still relatively uncommon, have the potential for substantial increases in
the future.
The case also raises questions concerning Vick‘s legal representation,
particularly how counsel handled the prospects of successive prosecutions by
federal and state entities. Some of the questionable strategy decisions directly
increased the possibility that Vick would be subjected to the unusual dual
prosecutions, and his counsel offered surprisingly little legal resistance.
1129, 1131 (2008); K. Michelle Welch, Animal Law, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 185, 187 (2009); Rosemary
Thompson, The Cruel Web of Dog Fighting: Breaking the Chain of Violence, 21 CBA RECORD 14, 14
(Nov. 2007). See also Francesca Ortiz, Making the Dogman Heel: Recommendations for Improving
Effectiveness of Dogfighting Laws, 3 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL‘Y 1 (2010) (discussing a
comprehensive study of current dogfighting laws enacted in the aftermath of Vick‘s case, contending
that much more needs to be done, and offering recommendations for more effective enforcement).
4. This inquiry is necessary regardless of the risk of being labeled insufficiently sympathetic to
the scourge of animal abuse. All defendants, even those accused of atrocities far worse that Vick, are
entitled to the fair administration of justice. At the Nuremburg trials, some of the non-American
Allied prosecutors, more familiar with Continental criminal justice systems, protested the application
of American criminal procedures as unfair to the accused Nazis. NEIL COHEN & DONALD HALL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, CASES AND MATERIALS 387 (3d. ed.
2000) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?
A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,4 (1990)).
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Vick‘s case serves as yet another cautionary tale concerning the lurking
pitfalls of successive prosecutions.
Lastly, and somewhat unexpectedly, the Vick case has emerged as a
harbinger case where professional athletes now have to factor the difficult
calculus of not only criminal defense strategy considerations but also of
strategy considerations concerning possible punishment from the league
commissioner, regardless of whether criminal charges were proven or even
brought in the first place. Athletes now must understand that they may be
whipsawed to provide full disclosure to the commissioner and must recognize
that their disclosures could be used against them in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. Prior generally accepted assumptions and procedures concerning
the timing of these investigations, the requirement that criminal guilt first be
established and the ―finality‖ of prior criminal investigations, no longer apply.
This article undertakes an examination of these issues.
I. VICK‘S FALL FROM GRACE
During the off-season after the end of the 2006 football season, National
Football League (NFL) star quarterback Vick signed a $120 million contract.
He had lucrative endorsement contracts with Nike, and his number seven
Atlanta Falcons football jersey was one of the most popular items of NFL
properties.5 If Vick was not on top of the world of professional celebrity, he
was close to it.
Less than a year later, Vick was under an indefinite NFL suspension, had
been stripped of his endorsements, had been essentially pauperized, his
number seven jersey had been banned from sale,6 had agreed to pay
approximately $900,000 to the federal government to care for his dogs,7 and
had been sentenced to twenty-three months in federal prison. Later, a state
prosecution commenced, where he would eventually plead guilty to another
dogfighting related felony that did not result in any additional prison time.8
Vick has now served his time, and almost everyone involved has
undergone a rehabilitation of sorts. His former dogs were stars of a cable

5. Falcon‟s Vick Has Second-Best Selling Jersey, ESPN.COM, Dec. 30, 2004, http://sports.espn.
go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1956185.
6. Nike Ices Vick‟s Pact; Reebok Halts Sale of No. 7 Jersey, ESPN.COM, July 28, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2951789.
7. Jailed Quarterback to Pay for Care of Seized Pit Bulls, ESPN.COM, Nov. 29, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3133102.
8. Vick Pleads Guilty to State Dogfighting Charges, NBCSPORTS.COM, Nov. 26, 2008,
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/27907258/.
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television series9 and even made the cover of Sports Illustrated10and, later,
Parade Magazine.11 Vick was able to return to the NFL for the 2009 season,
subject to a two-game suspension, after having undergone some type of
psychological reeducation where, despite a lifetime of participation, he now
professed the utter depravity of dogfighting. Vick recently completed an
extraordinarily successful 2010 season, where he was selected to the Pro Bowl
by a league wide vote of players, coaches, and fans.12
Just what was Vick‘s federal crime? He pled guilty to a felony conspiracy
to violate the Travel Act, officially titled ―Interstate. . .travel. . .in aid of
racketeering enterprises,‖13 a point graphically illustrated when the federal
sentencing judge observed that the federal sentence he was about to impose
was for a racketeering offense.14
In more precise legal terms, Vick was involved in interstate dogfighting,
which, at the time of the acts alleged in the indictment, was a rarely prosecuted
federal misdemeanor. The government was able, by legal sleight of hand, to
indict Vick for a federal felony conspiracy offense. The primary reasons for
his harsh sentence, however, were allegations of severe animal cruelty,
including the gruesome execution of some of his dogs, and an apparent lack of
candor concerning the extent of his involvement in bankrolling a gambling
enterprise. The extensive punishment based on the animal cruelty was
somewhat remarkable because ―animal cruelty‖ is not even a federal crime.
By the end of 2008, Vick was about to be released from federal prison,
contingent upon resolution of additional state criminal charges arising out of
the same dogfighting episode.
9. The dogs were featured on the popular National Geographic Channel program, ―DogTown.‖
See Francisco Vara-Orta, “DogTown” Returns Tonight with Focus on Michael Vick‟s Dogs, LA
TIMES BLOG, (Sept. 5, 2008, 8:21 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/unleashed/2008/09/dogtownreturns.html. Vick‘s own personal journey of redemption was chronicled on a BET television series.
See Lisa de Morales, Coming to BET: Michael Vick‟s Contrition, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2009, at C6.
10. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 29, 2008 (Cover); see also Jim Gorant, Happy New Year,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 29, 2008, at 72-77 (recounting rehabilitation efforts for abused pit bulls).
11. PARADE, Aug. 15, 2010 (Cover); see also Jim Gorant, Can You Teach a Bad Dog New
Tricks? PARADE, Aug. 15, 2010 at 4-5 (excerpting Gorant‘s forthcoming book, JIM GORANT, THE
LOST DOGS: MICHAEL VICK‘S DOGS AND THEIR TALE OF RESCUE AND REDEMPTION (2010)).
12. See Sean Gregory, Prison to Pro Bowl: The Meaning of Michael Vick, TIME.COM, Jan. 30,
2011, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2044938,00.html.
13. Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952 (2011).
14. The trial judge‘s comments are reported at George Dohrmann, What‟s Next for Michael Vick
After Agreeing to Plea?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED.COM, Aug. 20, 2007, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
vault/article/web/COM1058212/index.htm (discussing a district judge‘s comment noting that Vick‘s
guilty plea was based on federal racketeering charges and that his sentence would be calculated
accordingly).
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Vick‘s conduct was cruel and reprehensible. Nonetheless, Vick was
treated incredibly harshly by the criminal justice system, and he had already
paid an enormous price for, at the outset, foolishly thinking about his public
relations image and standing with the NFL, rather than focusing exclusively
on the best course of legal action. A careful review of the details of the federal
prosecution is in order.
II. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND ALL THINGS DOG
Dogs have been chasing mailmen since the inception of home delivery of
mail. A 1929 front page Washington Post headline proclaimed that
―Unleashed Dogs Bring Woe to Suburban Mail Carriers.‖15 Despite the
decrease in the mail monopoly over the last eight decades because of the rise
of e-mail, electronic bill payment, and private delivery services, the canine
interference problem still persists. The United States Postal Service
designated a week in May 2008 as National Dog Bite Prevention Week,
emphasizing the fact that, in 2007, more than 3000 city and rural postal
carriers were bitten by canines.16 Local newspapers still report on instances
where dogs impede the home delivery of mail.17 Nevertheless, despite the fact
that dogs have long interfered with this important federal function identified in
the Constitution, Congress has heretofore resisted the federal regulation of all
things canine.
The Vick dogfighting prosecution brought massive short-term publicity to
the inhumane treatment of dogs, pit bulls in particular, raised for blood sport.
As a consequence, several states responded and increased the penalties for
dogfighting.18 Even before Vick‘s case achieved extensive notoriety,
Congress raised interstate dogfighting from a misdemeanor to a felony in
2008.19

15. Unleashed Dogs Bring Woe to Suburban Mail Carriers, WASH. POST, July 12, 1929, at A1.
16. US Postal Service Dog Bite Awareness: Learn More About It, USPS.COM, May 15, 2008,
http://www.usps.com/communications/community/dogbite.htm.
17. See, e.g., Hallie Woods, Postal Carriers‟ Plight More Than a Cliché, FT. COLLINS
COLORADOAN, Nov. 11, 2007, at 4A; Tami Abdollah, Postman Recovering After Pit Bull Attack, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, at 4B; Erin Cargile, Loose Dogs Interfere With Mail Delivery, KRISTV.COM,
July 17, 2007, http:// kristv.com/global/story.asp?s=6802717 (July 17, 2007) (reporting on loose dog
problem in Corpus Christi, Texas); Ameilia Nielson-Stowell, Stoppage of Mail Service due to Dog
Causes Growls, DESERET (Salt Lake City) MORNING NEWS, Apr. 26, 2007 (reporting that five houses
in cul-de-sac were cut off from mail delivery because of recurring problem with golden retriever).
18. J.L. Miller, Bills Toughen Penalties for Dog-Fighting, THE NEWS JOURNAL, Dec. 20, 2007,
at 3B.
19. Animal Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C.§ 1 app. C, amend.
721 (2011).
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However, Vick‘s offenses took place before the charge had been increased
to a felony, and ex post facto considerations made it constitutionally
impossible to prosecute Vick directly for the new federal dogfighting felony.
Moreover, the United States Department of Justice does not consider, and has
never considered, dogfighting a significant federal prosecutorial priority, even
after Congress elevated the penalties to felony grade.20
The circumstances that led to Vick‘s federal dogfighting prosecution, and
the inquiry into whether additional state charges were valid, appropriate, and
necessary, illustrate another example in the ongoing debate concerning the
appropriate role of federal law enforcement and state law enforcement for
conduct that violates both federal and state law. For a number of reasons that
have been exhaustively analyzed over the last few decades, this subject matter
overlap continues to grow, largely as a result of Congress‘s decisions to enact
new federal crimes that cover conduct already criminal under state law.21
Multiple prosecutions for the same underlying conduct are rare and are usually
reserved for situations when the first prosecution, often a state prosecution,
results in an acquittal under circumstances that suggest some type of
miscarriage of justice.
Vick, on the other hand, was the recipient of unusually harsh treatment
from the tag-team of collective prosecutorial entities—where he ultimately
pled guilty to both federal and state felony charges. Vick bears some
responsibility for the sequence of events that led to both federal and state
prosecutions and convictions. Vick and his advisors had to measure the
probable consequences of both the criminal justice system and the NFL
Commissioner and devise a strategy that addressed both concerns. As will be
further discussed, some of Vick‘s decisions, legal or otherwise, were
interpreted as a lack of candor or as a sign of insufficient remorse and made a
20. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE STRATEGIC PLAN 2007-2012 (no mention of dog fighting).
21. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION
OF CRIME 1 (1998) (noting ―core‖ of study concerns recent increase in federal criminal legislation
over last few decades that significantly overlaps with crimes traditionally prosecuted by the states); H.
Scott Wallace, The Drive to Federalize is a Road to Ruin, CRIM. JUST. 8 (Fall 1993) (noting corrosive
effects of ―overfederalzation‖ of conduct traditionally prosecuted under state law). For a more
mocking, but still serious, study of the over federalization and over criminalization issue in general,
see HARVEY A. SILVERGATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT
(2009) (contending that the American criminal justice system has become dysfunctional and that the
typical American is likely unaware that he or she unwittingly commits several felonies per day based
on absurdly vague and broad scope of scores of federal regulatory prohibitions, which results in
vulnerability to arbitrary prosecution).
The recent elevation of federal dogfighting charges to felony status continues this trend.
Although the measure passed with large congressional majorities, some members questioned the
―need [for] greater federal intervention on dogfighting when it‘s already illegal in all 50 states.‖
Ortiz, supra note 3, at 23 (comments of Rep. Westmoreland).
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difficult legal situation even worse.
One cannot say with any degree of certainty that Vick could have achieved
a better result had different decisions been made and different strategies
adopted. Nevertheless, upon careful analysis of the record, Vick faced a
multitude of successive prosecution and sentencing issues, some of which may
have been able to be avoided altogether and others which may have been able
to have been shaped or otherwise confronted in a more advantageous posture.
A. Federal Case Overview
In August 2007, Vick pled guilty to the lone federal criminal charge in a
one count indictment arising out of an interstate dogfighting enterprise.22 The
case began as an off-shoot of a narcotics investigation concerning individuals
other than Vick. A search warrant of Vick‘s Virginia property yielded
evidence of organized dogfighting, and state and federal investigations
ensued.23
Vick was allegedly the main financial backer in the enterprise, ominously
named ―Bad NewzKennels.‖ The public outcry demanding prison for Vick,
and worse,24 was centered almost exclusively on the sensational allegations
that underperforming dogs were systematically and brutally executed and less
so on the scourge of interstate dogfighting per se.
The terms of the federal plea agreement made clear that prison time for
Vick was allegedly appropriate because of the ―heinous‖ acts of animal
cruelty. Yet, Vick faced no specific federal animal cruelty charges because no
such federal crime existed. The central ―federal‖ aspect of the federal case
against Vick, the fortuity of interstate transportation of dogs to engage in
dogfighting, was a federal misdemeanor at the relevant times alleged in Vick‘s
indictment. Conviction for such a crime ordinarily does not warrant federal
prison time and rarely even warrants federal prosecution. Moreover, the
prospect of any prison time was even more unlikely for someone like Vick,
who had no prior criminal record.

22. See Indictment, United States v. Vick, Criminal No. 3:07CR (E.D. Va. filed July 17, 2007)
[hereinafter Federal Indictment].
23. Ortiz, supra note 3, at 6 n.23.
24. For example, at one of the first hearings after the indictment, some animal rights protesters
stood outside the federal courthouse, holding signs which read ―Neuter Vick.‖ Mike Kulick, Vick‟s
Mixed Welcome, RICHMOND.COM, July 27, 2007, http://www2.richmond.com/news/2007/jul/27/
vicks-mixed-welcome-ar-593919/. Later, some animal rights groups argued that Vick should be
required to get a brain scan as a precondition to determine his fitness to return to professional football.
Bob Molinaro, What Does PETA Expect to Find Inside Vick‟s Head?, VA. PILOT, Jan. 23, 2009, at
C1.
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B. The Curious Decision to Initiate Federal Prosecution
State and local prosecutors normally prosecute animal cruelty and
dogfighting cases in order to vindicate the societal interest in protecting
domestic animals. Just why, then, was Vick prosecuted in federal court?
Dogfighting in Virginia is a state law felony, and Virginia gambling statutes
reach a ―gambling enterprise‖ if the conduct impacts a financial daily
threshold of $2,000,25 a monetary threshold easily met in this case. In
addition, a plethora of Virginia animal cruelty statutes abound.
Vick‘s federal charges, as measured by the statutory elements, had nothing
to do with the killing of the dogs. Vick‘s federal dogfighting charges were
dependent on the interstate fortuity that some of the dogs were allegedly
purchased in New York and North Carolina.26 Had Vick‘s Bad Newz Kennels
raised all its dogs locally, kept the gambling limited to locals, and only fought
the dogs within Virginia, federal jurisdiction for these particular charges
would have likely been absent. In that case, any prospective federal
prosecution of Vick would have had to rely on an even more contorted
exhaustive examination of the entirety of federal law to find an applicable
indictable offense than what actually occurred.
The federal prosecution took shape only after local Virginia authorities
signaled they were unlikely to pursue criminal charges against Vick,
apparently because of a lack of evidence concerning Vick‘s direct
involvement.27 Had the State decided to prosecute at the outset, a subsequent
separate federal prosecution would have been unlikely, regardless of the
outcome. Some media speculated that the local prosecutor, an AfricanAmerican, was reluctant to prosecute a prominent African-American athlete.
The local prosecutor defended his initial reluctance by commenting that he
would not ―be pushed into bringing charges that won‘t stand.‖28

25. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-328 (2011).
26. See Animal Fighting Venture Prohibition, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2156(a)(1), (b) (2011). The interstate
allegation is specifically set forth in the indictment.
27. This situation would change. As the federal investigation moved forward, other persons
involved would eventually agree to testify against Vick. Whether the local prosecutor would have
pursued this course of action without the initial federal impetus cannot be determined. The fact that,
after the federal prosecution, the local prosecutor also relied on the same cooperators cannot be read
to suggest that such cooperation would have materialized even without the initial federal prosecution.
In any event, on this point, Vick could have taken lessons from Barry Bonds on finding loyal friends.
See United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting significant evidentiary obstacles
faced by prosecutors in perjury prosecution against Bonds as a result of Bonds‘ friend‘s refusal to
testify even after a grant of immunity and an imposition of prison sentence for contempt).
28. Vick Dogfighting Case Opens up Racial Divide, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 3, 2007,
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/20112312/.
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This statement suggests that the local prosecutor was not convinced of the
strength of the evidence based on the available evidence at the time. If a local
prosecutor chose not to prosecute a case that he would have otherwise
prosecuted solely because of race, that would have strengthened the federal
government‘s decision to consider federal prosecution by applying wellrecognized Department of Justice principles.29 However, even in that extreme
situation, it still is unclear if the normal federal policies and guidelines on
whether to initiate a prosecution of non-violent offenders for relatively minor
offenses would have justified federal prosecution.30
At this point, two ancillary points must be noted. First, when the story
first broke, it seemed Vick was primarily concerned with not being implicated
in anything related to gambling. The gambling aspect may have seemed
relatively unimportant to law enforcement, particularly after evidence of
torture of dogs emerged. However, Vick was obviously concerned about
running afoul of NFL policy and the NFL Commissioner‘s authority to
suspend Vick based on involvement in gambling.31 Undoubtedly, Vick‘s
initial—and ultimately devastating—step was viewed through the prism of
seeking to avoid a gambling suspension from the NFL as a first priority and
not protecting himself from criminal prosecution.
Second, as evidenced by the state prosecutor‘s initial reaction that little
evidence directly implicated Vick, Vick seemed to be deluded into thinking
that his friends and accomplices would not implicate him. This gambit rarely
works, regardless of celebrity status. The prosecution simply holds too many
cards and too many inducements.32
Nevertheless, apart from Vick‘s notoriety, the Vick federal prosecution
did not fit the model of when the federal government should get involved in
29. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL § 9-27.240(A)(2) (2007) [hereinafter U.S.A.M.]
(discussing other jurisdiction‘s ability and willingness to prosecute effectively as a factor in
determining whether federal prosecution was appropriate). The companion comment further notes
that ―the Federal prosecutor should be alert to any local . . . attitudes . . . or other circumstances that
might cast doubt on the likelihood of the state or local authorities conducting a thorough and
successful prosecution.‖ Id. § (B)(2).
30. See generally U.S.A.M. § 9-2.031(A) (2009) (discussing policy for dual and successive
prosecutions where the matter must involve a substantial federal interest).
31. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012, art. XI, sec. 1 (discussing
Commissioner authority to suspend players). The new NFL Personal Conduct Policy is further
discussed at Part IV, infra. In addition to this policy, the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement
contains an ―integrity of game‖ provision, which gives the commissioner authority to suspend a
player for, inter alia, ―knowingly associate[ing] with gamblers or gambling activity.‖ Id. at app. 15.
For a further discussion of significant pro football gambling suspensions, see note 153, infra.
32. This point is further discussed at text and accompanying note 54, infra. After Vick pled
guilty, he acknowledged that he thought that his fame and money would insulate him from any
adverse consequences. See also notes 107 and 168, infra.
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dogfighting cases.33 Department of Justice guidelines specifically provide that
an individual‘s notoriety and the surrounding public sentiment should not
influence the decision to initiate a federal prosecution unless the prosecution
can be otherwise justified under the applicable guidelines.34 Thus, as noted
above, unless it was definitively established that state authorities were relying
on illegitimate motives in not pursuing a case they would otherwise have
pursued, no overriding policy basis existed that required this federal
prosecution.
Moreover, Vick‘s case arguably should not have been brought in federal
court under any circumstances because no substantial federal interest was
present.35 If no substantial federal interest is present, federal prosecutors
should exercise their discretionary authority and limited resources to
investigate and prosecute far more serious crimes that warrant federal attention
as designated federal priorities and that do not overlap with minor state crimes.
This is no idle academic point. At the time of Vick‘s prosecution, violent
crime was on the increase.36 Given the multitude of federal statutes enacted
over the last few decades that reach violent crime, scarce federal prosecutorial
resources should have been directed toward this stated federal priority.37
Moreover, in the post-9/11 world, federal prosecutorial resources have shifted
toward antiterrorism efforts, leaving federal prosecutors unable to effectively
prosecute significant cases like public corruption—another subject which
implicates significant federal prosecutorial priorities.38 As further illustration,
during this same time period, the Washington Post reported in a front page
article that, as a result of the shift in focus to terrorism and immigration cases,
―[t]he Justice Department. . .has retreated from prosecutions of mobsters,
white-collar criminals, environmental crimes and traditional civil rights
infractions.‖39
Under these circumstances, it is hard to justify Vick‘s federal prosecution
no matter how gruesome the evidence of animal abuse. In a society where

33. See generally U.S.A.M., 9-27.000, Principles of Federal Prosecution.
34. U.S.A.M. § 9-27.230 (B)(2) (2009).
35. Id. § 9-27.230 (A).
36. FBI: Violent Crimes in U.S. Rise, MSNBC.COM, Sept. 24, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/20956036.
37. DOJ STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 20, at 1 (listing combating violent crime as number two
priority after prevention of terrorism).
38. See, e.g., Scot J. Paltrow, Justice Delayed: Budget Crunch Hits U.S. Attorneys‟ Offices,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2007, at A1.
39. Dan Eggen & John Solomon, Justice Dept.‟s Focus Has Shifted: Terror, Immigration are
Current Priorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2007, at A1.

KURLAND (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE PROSECUTI ON OF M ICHAEL VI CK

7/15/2011 10:23 AM

475

millions of dogs are still euthanized each year,40 even the torture and
execution of dozens of dogs does not necessarily translate into a substantial
federal interest and an urgent federal prosecutorial priority, regardless of
whether the state prosecutors are willing to pursue state charges.41 Moreover,
there was no overriding need for the federal government to vindicate
Virginia‘s interests in prosecuting Virginia gambling offenses, the actual state
law felony anchor of ―unlawful activity‖ that made up the Travel Act
conspiracy in Vick‘s indictment. By all available accounts, there had been no
recent public outcry that Virginia authorities had been extraordinarily lax in
prosecuting these types of cases to the point where federal intervention was
deemed necessary.
As for the federal interstate dogfighting charges, Congress recently
elevated these charges to felonies (after the operative dates in the Vick case)
because federal prosecutors were understandably reluctant to pursue such
relatively insignificant misdemeanors.42 That may mean that future interstate
dogfighting allegations will be viewed more seriously—a supposition not
clearly borne out by recent federal court caseload statistics,43—but the
40. Recent reliable studies estimate that approximately 1.6 million dogs, more than half of them
pit bulls, are euthanized each year. Moreover, approximately 25% of all shelter dogs were
relinquished by their owner, and many are relinquished for ridiculous reasons. Thus, hundreds of
thousands of dogs are condemned to death each year by owners who suffer no legal consequences for,
in effect, causing their death. Jennifer Copley, Cat and Dog Adoption and Euthanasia Statistics,
SUITE101.COM, Dec. 13, 2009, http//www.suite101.com/content/cat-and-dog-adoption-and-euthan
asia-statistics-a179507; see also 2009 U.S. Shelter Data: Pit Bulls Account for 58% of Dogs
Euthanized, DOGSBITE.ORG, Aug. 24, 2009, http//blog.dogsbite.org/2009/08/2009-us-shelter-datashows-that-pit-html.
41. Again, this assertion recognizes that the state‘s lack of willingness to prosecute is a factor in
determining whether federal prosecution is appropriate. U.S.A.M. § 9-27.240 A(2) (2007).
Additionally, the possibility of effective non-criminal prosecution alternatives should have been more
carefully considered. Federal prosecutorial guidelines counsel that federal prosecutors should
determine whether ―there exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution‖ in determining
whether a federal prosecution should be declined. U.S.A.M. § 9-27.250(A). The companion
comment notes that ―resort to the criminal process is not necessarily the only appropriate response to
serious forms of antisocial activity.‖ Id. § (B) (emphasis added). This option therefore is not
intended to be limited to only minor violations. The NFL changed its disciplinary policy in 2007 to
sanction discipline even in the absence of a criminal conviction. Thus, the NFL could have imposed
substantial monetary fines (including provisions to pay for the rehabilitation of the dogs), mental
health treatment, and suspension. See discussion at Part IV, infra. Although some of Vick‘s conduct
straddled the 2007 effective date of the new policy, a severe NFL discipline case could likely have
been established that would have vindicated virtually all legitimate interests without having to resort
to the draconian hammer of federal prosecution.
42. See H.R. Res. 137, 110th Cong. (2007); Hearing on H.R. Res. 137, Hearing Before the
Comm. On the Judiciary Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 27
(2007) (statement of Humane Society).
43. The most recent federal judicial caseload statistics for 2005-09 specifically identify the
number of Migratory Bird prosecutions but contain no recognizable category for federal dogfighting
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elevation of dogfighting to a federal felony still does not transform dogfighting
into a substantial federal priority—nor should it.
Lastly, dogfighting often occurs in a criminal environment intertwined
with drug dealing, illegal gun possession, and other serious federal felonious
conduct. Accordingly, virtually all of the most recent federal dogfighting
misdemeanor prosecutions, prior to the time Congress raised the crime to a
felony, were part of larger indictments that included a multitude of other
serious federal felonies, thus making federal prosecution appropriate.44
However, Vick‘s case, with its lone charge exclusively based on dogfighting,
did not fit that model either.
1. The Indictment
The choice of the lone federal charge in Vick‘s indictment offers a
window into the mosaic-like ―art‖ of federal prosecutorial decision making,
particularly when federal prosecutors are determined to bring a felony
indictment against a particular defendant. Vick‘s indictment contained one
count: a multi-object conspiracy to violate the Travel Act45 (Conspiracy to
Travel in Interstate Commerce in Aid of Unlawful Activities; to wit, various
Virginia antigambling and dog fight wagering statutes) and to Sponsor a Dog
in an Animal Fighting Venture that moved in interstate commerce. The
alleged conspiracy spanned the time period from early 2001 to April 25, 2007.
As part of the ―means of the conspiracy,‖ the indictment detailed several
gruesome execution techniques to kill underperforming dogs. However, those
allegations were not necessary to establish either the interstate transportation
of dogs or the Virginia gambling prongs of the charged conspiracy. The
animal cruelty allegations against Vick were arguably irrelevant with respect
to the actual federal charges for which he was indicted.46
The felony conspiracy charge carried a maximum sentence of five years.
charges. As best as can be ascertained, those charges are subsumed in a ―general crime‖ category that
reflects no substantial change over last three years. See Federal Court Caseload Statistics 2005-2009,
Table D-2 (no listed category for federal dog fighting charges).
44. See, e.g. News Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, “Operation Bite Back‖ Results in Federal
Drug, Gun, Other Charges Against Nine Involved in Dog-Fighting Ring, S.D. Ohio (Mar. 27, 2007)
(forty-six-count indictment where ―[dog-fighting] served as breeding ground for illegal drug and gun
activity that reaches across state lines‖).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2011).
46. There is always a question whether ancillary allegations in a conspiracy indictment can
transform otherwise arguably inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence. An interesting
argument could be made that, had Vick‘s federal case gone to trial, all of the animal cruelty evidence
concerning the execution of the dogs should have been excluded as either irrelevant or unfairly
prejudicial. Presumably, that evidence would have been properly considered at sentencing in the
event of a conviction.
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As noted above, the charged conspiracy had two objects: (1) the pursuit of
minor state law misdemeanor and felony gambling charges relating to
wagering on dog fights,47 dressed up as a maximum five year federal felony
by virtue of the Travel Act48 and (2) the commission of federal misdemeanors
concerning the interstate transport of dogs to engage in an illegal dogfighting
venture.49As noted above, Congress raised the offense of dogfighting with an
interstate aspect to a felony for all acts committed after May 2007, so this
amendment had no effect on Vick‘s case, which alleged conspiratorial conduct
as far back as 2001.
The Travel Act, the federal felony hammer utilized to prosecute Vick, has
a colorful, if not fully understood, history. The statute is a 1960s era creation
of then Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who sought more effective tools
to prosecute Jimmy Hoffa and other organized crime ―hoodlums‖ and
―racketeers‖ in federal court. Kennedy even had a close group of Justice
Department lawyers dubbed the ―Get Hoffa‖ group, who advised Kennedy on
fresh approaches to combat labor racketeering, which included the drafting of
the Travel Act.50 Kennedy himself testified before Congress in support of the
proposed Travel Act legislation, which he and his loyalists had devised.51
The Travel Act was also the first federal statute to wholly incorporate
definitions of state crimes as elements of a federal criminal statute. The
Travel Act‘s definitional structure of ―unlawful activity‖ meant that federal
prosecutors could, by prosecutorial sleight of hand, reconfigure minor state
law offenses, such as gambling and wagering on dog fights, and indict them as
federal felonies subject to five years imprisonment.52
That is precisely what happened here. Because of the potential for
47. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3.1-796.124(A)(2) (repealed 2010), 18.2-326, 328 (2011).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1952. A substantive Travel Act violation can be based on federal or state law
misdemeanors if the conduct qualifies as ―unlawful activity‖ as defined by the Travel Act. Barry
Breen, The Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952): Prosecution of Interstate Acts in Aid of Racketeering, 24
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 125, 162-63 (1986). The federal dogfighting misdemeanor does not constitute the
requisite ―unlawful activity.‖ The Travel Act has no conspiracy provision. Thus, a Travel Act
conspiracy charge must be based on the general federal conspiracy statute, which is a five-year
offense if based on a felony but only a one-year maximum offense if the object of the conspiracy is a
misdemeanor. See Conspiracy to Commit Offense or Defraud United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2011).
Thus, the federal prosecutors in Vick‘s case had to rely on state law felonies to produce an indictable
federal offense that carried a five-year maximum sentence.
49. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2156(a)(1)(b) (2010).
50. See generally RONALD GOLDFARB, PERFECT VILLAINS, IMPERFECT HEROES: ROBERT F.
KENNEDY‘S WAR AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME 54-55 (1995).
51. See Legislation Relating to Organized Crime, Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
Comm. On the Judiciary H. of Reps., 87th Cong. 16. at 18-20 (1961) (statement of then Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy).
52. Breen, supra note 48, at 163. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
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prosecutorial abuse, the Department of Justice has long cautioned prosecutors
to consult the Principles of Federal Prosecutions to ensure the presence of a
substantial federal interest, so as to prevent what are, in essence, minor state
charges from being bootstrapped into federal felonies as a matter of course.53
However, despite a plethora of federal prosecutorial guidelines, discussed
above, which generally should have counseled against bringing this
prosecution, Vick‘s federal felony prosecution went forward.
C. A Strange—and Strained—Plea Agreement
How Vick came to plead guilty so quickly to the lone federal conspiracy
charge returned by the grand jury is, at the same time, both mundane and
complex. The end result of the plea agreement was that Vick was left
surprisingly vulnerable far beyond what otherwise would have been expected.
After Vick‘s three co-defendants quickly worked out plea agreements,
which included their obligation to testify against Vick—thereby overcoming
the supposed key prosecutorial obstacle that had stymied the local
prosecutor,—Vick and his lawyers apparently saw the proverbial writing on
the wall, and he pled guilty to the lone conspiracy charge rather than wait for a
second superseding indictment that was certain to include additional
substantive charges. By pleading guilty to the conspiracy charge, Vick faced a
federal maximum of five years imprisonment. By pursuing this course, Vick
followed the path taken by approximately ninety percent of all federal
defendants who eventually plead guilty.54
In that respect, the resolution of the Vick case is unremarkable. Vick pled
guilty to the one count in the indictment, apparently one step ahead of a
probable superseding indictment that would have contained additional charges
and posed a larger theoretical maximum possible sentence. Vick also
understood that the case against him was now buttressed by the cooperation of
the three co-defendants who had already pled guilty.
These were, to be sure, damaging developments from Vick‘s perspective.
Nonetheless, why would Vick rush to plead guilty where prison time was
assured, where the prospect of additional state charges and possible additional
consecutive prison time remained unresolved, and where Vick‘s statement in

53. See generally Breen, supra note 48, at 127 n.18 (recognizing potential breadth of Travel Act
and cautioning that it, generally, should not be used to combat minor illegal acts). The Supreme
Court has also long cautioned that indiscriminate application of the Travel Act could as ―a matter of
happenstance . . . transform relatively minor state offenses into federal felonies.‖ Rewis v. United
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971).
54. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, MODE OF CONVICTION FOR U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS, FISCAL YEAR 2009, tbl. 5.34.2009 (over 90% of federal defendants plead guilty).
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his plea colloquy and agreed to statement of facts could be used against him
without limitation at a subsequent state trial?55 What other federal charges
against Vick would have been included in a superseding indictment that so
convinced—or panicked—Vick that entering into a plea agreement barely a
month after the indictment with the unusual concession to an upward departure
(discussed below) that both guaranteed jail time and waived his right to appeal
was seen as his best option?
A defendant agreeing to such a substantial upward departure is quite
unusual to say the least. Even the United States Attorney prosecuting Vick
could not restrain from gloating about it in the official press release following
Vick‘s guilty plea.56
A superseding indictment likely would have included a number of
substantive animal fighting misdemeanor counts. So what? Routine
application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines calculations, perhaps, would
have raised the theoretical maximum sentence by one year for each additional
misdemeanor count, but it is unlikely such a prosecutorial sleight of hand
would have substantially altered the basic guidelines calculation. The United
States Attorney acknowledged as much in his press release, commenting,
―Although we could have asked the Grand Jury to consider additional
substantive charges . . . the essence of the case . . . would have remained about
the same and the actual sentence [as opposed to the statutory maximum
sentence] likely would have also remained about the same.‖57
The federal prosecutors could have larded a superseding indictment with a
multitude of substantive Travel Act felonies, but those counts would have
been largely predicated on Virginia gambling offenses. The most significant
threat to increase Vick‘s statutory maximum sentence would have been the
inclusion of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) charge,
55. Although the state had apparently determined it had insufficient evidence to go forward at the
outset, a plethora of new admissible information would be available as a result of the federal
prosecution and plea agreement that would make any subsequent state prosecution a virtual certainty
for conviction. This is precisely what occurred. The most obvious example is Vick‘s factual basis to
support the plea, which constituted an evidentiary admission against Vick that would be admissible in
any subsequent state trial. See discussion at note 63 and accompanying text, infra.
56. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, N.D.Va., Statement of
United States Attorney Chuck Rosenberg Regarding United States v. Peace, Phillips, Taylor, and Vick
(Aug. 27, 2007) (Rosenberg noting that ―while plea agreements in the federal system are common, it
is highly unusual for a defendant to agree to recommend a sentence above the advisory guideline
range.‖).
57. Id. Department of Justice guidelines generally discourage adding additional charges that do
not, in any meaningful way, affect appropriate sentencing parameters. See, e.g., U.S.A.M. § 9-27.320
(B)(2) (2009) (counseling that additional charges should be brought only where necessary to provide
for appropriate sentence and that, in order to achieve that result, it is usually not necessary to charge a
defendant with every offense for which he/she may technically be liable).
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the nuclear bomb of the federal arsenal,58 which really could have jacked up
the sentencing guidelines calculation. However, dogfighting is not a RICO
predicate, and the manipulation of Travel Act predicates based on minor state
law gambling charges is generally disfavored by the relevant RICO
guidelines.59 These extreme steps do not appear to have been seriously
contemplated.
Equally troubling, the plea agreement did not seek to eliminate the
possibility of additional state charges and did not appear to provide any
procedural protection to minimize, to whatever extent possible, the full effect
of any subsequent state prosecution, which, at the time Vick pled, had become
a likely possibility.60 Although Vick and the federal government lacked the
authority to eliminate the possibility of state prosecution outright, some steps
could have been taken to better protect Vick in a variety of important ways.
Because of the dual sovereignty doctrine, the federal government and Vick
could not unilaterally bind the state prosecutors so as to bar a subsequent state
prosecution. However, the State of Virginia could have been a voluntary party
to the agreement. The Department of Justice press release notes that several
state and local agencies participated in the investigation.61 Under these
circumstances, a global settlement that voluntarily bound all prosecutorial
entities would not have been unprecedented.62 This would seem particularly
apposite here, in that Vick agreed to prison time largely because of the animal
cruelty dimension that was essentially a state law interest that could not be
reached directly by federal law. In light of the fact that Vick‘s federal
admission as part of his plea effectively ―made‖ the state case against him,
how much effort would have been necessary to have had the local prosecutor
share the ―glory‖ of the resolution of the federal case—and agree not to bring
additional state charges?

58. See Ortiz, supra note 3, at 52 (discussing manipulation of certain RICO predicates and
potential characterization of dog fighting ring to constitute RICO enterprise that could support RICO
charge).
59. See U.S.A.M. §§ 9-110.200; 9-110-310(6)-(7) (2009).
60. The substantial amount of negative press received by the part-time local Surry County,
Virginia prosecutor for his initial decision not to pursue charges effectively guaranteed that he would
pursue ―fish in a barrel‖ state charges after the resolution of the federal case. Thus, the possibility of
resolving all possible criminal charges, state and federal—at the same time—should have been
seriously considered because resolution of the federal case was not going to resolve all potential
criminal charges.
61. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 56.
62. For a discussion of global settlement issues where federal and state charges are resolved at
the same time via voluntary agreement of the parties, see ADAM H. KURLAND, SUCCESSIVE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 315 (2001).
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The speed in which the federal plea was consummated appeared to rule
out time for substantial negotiation with the state prosecutor—a part-time
official of a small rural county who seemed overwhelmed by the federal
onslaught. If Vick‘s counsel felt confident that any subsequent state charges
were barred by Virginia law, an issue discussed below, regardless of a lack of
agreement with state prosecutors, such confidence was misplaced.
With state prosecution still an open possibility, Vick‘s admissions,
required by the terms of his federal plea agreement, were tantamount to
admissions to a variety of state crimes. These under oath statements could be
used against Vick at his state court trial without limitation.63 A nolo
contendere plea, the plea of choice for many celebrities in state court
prosecutions, apparently was not a realistic option because the federal
government, consistent with Department of Justice policy, would have voiced
emphatic opposition to such a disposition.64
However, did Vick consider an Alford plea? An Alford plea, where the
defendant concedes there is sufficient evidence to support the charges but does
not expressly admit guilt,65 may have interfered with Vick‘s quest to qualify
for acceptance of responsibility.66 Nonetheless, the required factual basis for
the plea could have been established without Vick‘s direct admission of guilt,
although such a move might have resulted in the district court rejecting the

63. See id. at 318-20 (discussing use of plea statements and other testimony at subsequent
criminal trial).
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(3) (explaining that, in federal prosecutions, before the court may
accept a nolo contendere plea, it must consider the government‘s views concerning the public interest
and the interests of justice). Most federal judges will not accept such a plea over government
objection. A nolo plea, if accepted, is designed to prohibit its use against the defendant in any
subsequent trial. See FED. R. EVID. 410 (2)(3).
65. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 (1970). Professional athletes have resolved
criminal case with Alford pleas. For example, former baseball pitcher Steve Howe, who had a long
history of serial recreational drug violations, resolved cocaine possession charges via an Alford plea.
Howe‘s case and subsequent MLB punishment is discussed in Janine Young Kim & Matthew Parlow,
Off-Court Misbehavior: Sports Leagues and Private Punishment, 99 J. OF CRIM. LAW & CRIMIN. 573,
580-581 (2009).
Because Alford pleas raise public perception concerns about the fair administration of justice,
particularly where the defendant attempts to project a public image of innocence, the Department of
Justice instructs federal prosecutors to oppose such pleas, except in the most unusual circumstances.
U.S.A.M. §§ 9-16.015, 27.440(B) (2007). However, government approval is not required. In
addition, federal rules governing guilty pleas do not require that the requisite factual basis for the plea
be provided only by the defendant, see, e.g., United States v. Navedo, 516 F.2d 293, 296-98 & n.10
(2d Cir. 1975), and at least one court has held that it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to accept a
guilty plea ―solely because the defendant does not admit the alleged facts of the crime.‖ United States
v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
66. See note 101 and accompanying text, infra (discussion of ―lack of candor‖ may influence
qualification for ―acceptance of responsibility).
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plea for want of a sufficient factual basis for the plea.67 Additionally, had an
Alford plea been accepted, such a tactic may have sufficiently clouded the
evidentiary record so that any attempted use of Vick‘s federal plea statements
would have run a better chance of being excluded on probative value or unfair
prejudice grounds at any subsequent state trial.68
All told, given that the State kept open its option to pursue additional
criminal charges that could result in substantial additional prison time, Vick
had little to gain by pleading guilty so quickly. He may have been better off
forgoing acceptance of responsibility and pursuing a strategy that more
effectively limited the use of his statements made as part of the federal plea
colloquy at any subsequent state trial. Was this strategy even considered?
Moreover, given that a subsequent state prosecution was likely and no
steps were taken to limit the evidentiary impact of Vick‘s admissions, Vick
should have tried to maximize his chances of receiving concurrent sentences.
A number of options were available, but none seem to have been taken.
For example, the plea agreement could have included a provision whereby
the parties agreed to defer federal sentencing until the conclusion of any state
case—at which time the parties would agree to concurrent sentence.
Apparently, Vick‘s quick entry into the federal prison system was deemed of
paramount importance, so this option was not pursued. Federal penal
institutions, minimum security facilities in particular, provide relatively better
surroundings than do most state correctional facilities. In addition, once an
inmate is in the federal system, any additional state time is likely—but not
guaranteed—to be concurrent. Also, by having the federal time start as
quickly as possible, Vick, a world-class athlete with a finite window of
opportunity in which to pursue a lucrative professional career, faced an
urgency to start serving his sentence as quickly as possible, the better to
complete it and to hasten his projected return to the NFL.
However, under Virginia law, the decision to impose concurrent or

67. See supra note 65.
68. With an Alford plea, the factual basis for the plea would not be an unambiguous evidentiary
admission against the defendant. Any prosecutorial attempt to admit the plea in a subsequent case
would have to confront a litany of arguments that the statement was obtuse, ambiguous, and
confusing, and thus ripe for exclusion under the type of probative value or unfair prejudice-confusion
of the issues balancing test that exists in every jurisdiction. See, e.g. FED. R. EVID. 403; Lafon v.
Commonwealth, 438 S.E.2d 279, 283-84 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (explicating state common law
probative value or unfair prejudice evidentiary rule). Of course, precisely because of confusion and
unfair prejudice grounded in concerns that ―the public might well not understand or accept the fact
that a defendant who denied his guilt was nonetheless placed in a position of pleading guilty and
going to jail,‖ federal prosecutors object to the use in the first place. See U.S.A.M. § 9-27.440 (B)
(citing United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir. 1971)).
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consecutive time is within the sole discretion of the state judge.69 Thus,
angling to get Vick into the federal system as soon as possible, with the hopes
of having him eligible to play in the 2009 football season, was a gamble
because the agreement did not protect him in any way from additional
consecutive state time that could have delayed his opportunity to return to the
NFL for several more years. Such an outcome could have effectively ended
his professional career.
Moreover, Vick‘s return to the NFL at the earliest possible time would
also be facilitated if he could serve out the last few months of his sentence in a
federal half-way house, an option available to most federal prisoners.70
However, this option is not available if an inmate has unresolved pending
charges.71 Vick‘s lawyers apparently overlooked this issue when working out
his speedy federal plea that sent him into the federal system without resolution
of possible additional subsequent state charges.72 When the issue surfaced as
Vick became otherwise eligible for consideration as he neared completion of
his federal sentence, it led to frantic efforts to quickly resolve the state
charges, even if it meant forgoing meritorious arguments that the state charges
were legally invalid.
The agreed to statement of facts in the federal plea agreement fell just
short of Vick admitting his direct involvement in killing any dogs and,
specifically, did not include any admission of Vick gambling. This was
clearly done with an eye toward public relations and a desire to not directly
admit to state law animal abuse charges or to gambling involvement—which
would have likely meant an automatic and perhaps lifetime suspension from
the NFL.73

69. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-308 (2011).
70. See ALAN ELLIS & J. MICHAEL HENDERSON, FEDERAL PRISON GUIDEBOOK 64 (2010-2012
ed.) (finding most federal offenders will receive benefit of some residential re-entry center
placement).
71. See Bureau of Prisons Halfway House Rules, 28 C.F.R. § 571.10 (stating inmates in the
following categories shall not ordinarily participate in Community Corrections Center Programs—
inmates with unresolved pending charges which will likely lead to conviction or confinement).
72. This created a problem that likely contributed to Vick‘s decision not to contest the validity of
the state felony charges, which led to his state felony guilty plea. See discussion at notes 104, 144-45
and accompanying text, infra.
73. Vick‘s sidestepping of any direct admission of gambling was almost farcical, and he paid a
heavy price. Not only did this stance suggest a lack of candor to the court, but animal rights groups
exploited this incredulous position at the federal sentencing, arguing in their amicus brief that if Vick
bankrolled the dogfighting operation without sharing in any of the gambling proceeds:
[t]he only remaining inference to be drawn is that with no financial stake in the outcome
of these dogfights, Vick organized, funded and operated this grisly enterprise for the sheer
joy of watching two dogs tear each other apart and for the sadistic pleasure of torturing
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The legal nicety of trying to avoid directly admitting to dog killing had no
salutary effect on public opinion. Almost overnight, Vick chew toys for dogs
hit the market.74 Animal rights groups still filed documents with the federal
court seeking a near maximum term of almost five years, arguing that the
canine victims should be treated the same as human victims. Other anti-Vick
protesters held ―Neuter Vick‖ signs at the courthouse,75 endorsing a castration
message usually reserved for the most vile serial child rapists.
Vick, having failed to achieve any measurable public relations advantage,
gained little in the form of legal advantage. Under basic doctrines of
complicity and accessorial liability, Vick‘s refusal to directly admit to killing
any particular dog provided no legal mitigation. And, as noted above, the
structure and terms of the federal plea itself in no way offered any protection
from subsequent state prosecution.
Next, Vick‘s federal plea agreement contained the almost unheard of
agreement to an upward departure for an offense that might otherwise not
appear to require jail time, along with an ironclad agreement that Vick agree
that incarceration was appropriate. Vick also waived his right to appeal the
sentence.76
Again, Vick might have been better off just pleading straight up to the one
count indictment, recognizing that he faced a potential maximum of five years
imprisonment. At some point prior to the return of a superseding indictment, a
small window of opportunity to accomplish this existed, without any
government agreement as to sentence recommendation, and Vick could have
taken his chances at sentencing.
In a sense, Vick was no better off—and likely worse off—with the
―benefit‖ of the plea agreement. First, without an agreement, Vick would have
retained his right to appeal a prison sentence. Any sentence of incarceration
would have required an upward departure, which, in turn, could have been
challenged on appeal. In the post-Booker world, that would have been a
difficult, but not insurmountable, issue to win on appeal.77
and slaughtering those which did not meet his expectations.

Brief for Amici Curiae, United States v. Vick, 3:07-CR-274, at 18 (E.D. Va. Filed Sept. 6, 2007). For
a brief historical overview of gambling as triggering severe sanctions in professional sports, see note
153, infra.
74. See, e.g., Official Vick‟s Dog Chew Toy; Raising Awareness Towards Animal Abuse,
OFFICIALVICK‘SDOGCHEWTOY.COM, http://officialvickdogchewtoy.com/ (last visited Sept. 11,
2010).
75. Kulick, supra note 24.
76. Plea Agreement, United States v. Vick, Criminal No. 3:07CR274, para. 16 (E.D. Va. filed
Aug. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Vick Plea Agreement].
77. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(a)(1) (2009) (stating that, under the
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Next, if done in a timely fashion, the government would have been hardpressed not to accept his straight up plea—perhaps even an Alford plea—to the
entire one count indictment against him.78 As noted above, the impending
second superseding indictment would not have added charges that would have
substantially altered the sentencing calculation. In addition, in order to avoid
the perception of vindictiveness, the federal government rarely returns a
superseding indictment after the defendant has pled straight up to all of the
counts in the original indictment.
Vick‘s plea effectively guaranteed Vick a substantial period of
incarceration in return for the government agreeing not to argue for more than
twelve months, the low end of the ―agreed to‖ guideline range. Vick likely
thought the situation so dire that his best chance to limit prison time was to
agree with the government that a twelve-month sentence was appropriate and
to get ―credit‖ for acceptance of responsibility, given that the downside was a
maximum five years. This was a risky strategic gamble that was both legally
flawed and doomed to fail.
The timing of the guilty plea increased Vick‘s chances but did not
guarantee that he would get some credit for acceptance of responsibility.
However, if he tried to plead guilty to the original indictment, without a plea
agreement, prior to the issuance of a superseding indictment, Vick still would
have been eligible to receive a sentence reduction for acceptance of
responsibility.79 So, on that score, the guilty plea provided nothing.
In addition, the district court might not have been inclined to impose a
sentence greater than the twelve to eighteen month agreed upon range, no
matter how gruesome the evidence of dog killing. As discussed below, based
on the calculation in the plea agreement, it took an agreed to nine level upward
departure to get into the twelve to eighteen month range. That is a huge
increase. To put this increase in perspective, at most points on the sentencing
table, a nine level increase more than doubles both the low end and high end
of the sentencing range. Absent an agreement between the parties, such a
substantial increase would be unlikely, even with intense public opinion and
federal sentencing guidelines, a defendant may appeal his sentence under certain circumstances);
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). Post-Booker, the above guideline sentences are
routinely challenged on appeal, with some success. See, e.g., United States v. Weisser, 417 F.3d 336,
346 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing sentence that contained thirteen level increase in offense level and three
level criminal history increase).
78. The United States Attorneys Manual notes that federal prosecutors ―can and should
discourage Alford pleas by refusing to terminate prosecutions where an Alford plea is proffered to
fewer than all of the charges pending.‖ U.S.A.M. § 9-27.440 (B) (2007). However, in Vick‘s case,
he was charged with one count only and was thus willing to plead to the entirety of the indictment.
79. See generally United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550
U.S. 905 (2007).
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animal rights groups filing amicus briefs exhorting that Vick receive a
substantial prison sentence calculated, in part, by treating canine victims the
same as if they were human victims.80
On the other hand, under the plea agreement, the district court was still
free to ignore the plea agreement and sentence Vick up to five years. If the
evidence of dog killing was so extreme that the parties agreed that a nine point
upward departure was appropriate, the district court conceivably could have
been so outraged by that conduct so as to ignore the sentencing
recommendation altogether and sentence Vick up to five years. This was, in
essence, the position of the animal rights groups that filed briefs arguing for a
sentence near the five-year maximum. The trial court‘s decision to ignore the
sentencing recommendation, reject a proposed reduction for ―acceptance of
responsibility,‖ and impose a twenty-three-month sentence sufficiently proves
the point.
All told, the court declined to follow the sentencing recommendation, and
Vick then faced an even harsher sentence and was still bound by his waiver of
his right to appeal his sentence. In addition, the prospect of additional state
felony charges loomed. Under the circumstances, pleading straight up and
retaining the right to appeal does not seem so bad.
However, under the plea agreement Vick could not appeal his sentence
under any circumstances. Had Vick simply pled straight up, without the
government agreeing to advocate for no more than twelve to eighteen months,
Vick would have preserved his right to appeal any sentence of incarceration,
and he would have had the benefit of a relatively favorable standard of review
on appeal because the sentence would have been an above-the-guidelines
sentence and subject to an ―unreasonableness‖ challenge on appeal. This
would not be the first time that a defendant ultimately recognized, too late, that
most of the benefits in the plea agreement were illusory.81
In addition, the Sentencing Guidelines calculation set forth in the plea
agreement requires closer scrutiny. The calculation, such as it was, was
unduly harsh and probably legally incorrect. Nonetheless, it served as the
springboard for the district court to impose an even harsher sentence. Had the
calculation of the correct adjusted offense level been litigated, the end result
could have been more favorable to Vick—making imposition of a lengthy
prison term more difficult to support.
Travel Act prosecutions based on obscure state gambling statutes and
80. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 73, at 20-22.
81. See generally 1 PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 7.02[D][2] at 725 (Bamberger & Gotleib 4th ed. 2001) (cautioning against seemingly favorable sentencing deals that
prove illusory).
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federal misdemeanors are so uncommon that the parties were not even sure of
how to calculate the base offense level and sentence under the plea agreement.
The nine-page plea agreement, detailed in so many respects, stopped short of
identifying the precise base offense level. The government press release
echoed this uncertainty with the tepid assertion that the ―Guidelines appear to
advise a sentencing range of zero to six months.‖82 This was highly unusual
for plea agreements, which almost always identify a definite base offense level
as a starting point, even if other possible adjustments are left unresolved.
Reading between the lines, the parties apparently jointly concluded the
base offense level for this Travel Act conspiracy was ―apparently‖ Level 6.83
Vick had no prior criminal record, so a base offense Level 6 yields a
guidelines sentence of zero to six months, where probation is a likely
possibility. The government press release similarly noted that the Guidelines
would have yielded no more than six months imprisonment, further supporting
the unexpressed conclusion that the parties determined that base Level 6 was
the appropriate base offense level.84
As noted above, absent a term in the plea agreement agreeing to a nine
level increase, had the district court on its own increased Vick‘s sentence by a
nine level upward departure, such a finding would have been considered
aberrational in the extreme and would have certainly been appealed. Under
the plea agreement, however, (where no appeal of the sentence was permitted)
the parties agreed that Level 13 was appropriate (twelve to eighteen months)
after taking into account a two-point reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. This means that the parties, in effect, agreed to a whopping
nine point upward departure to reach Level 15 before subtracting two points
for acceptance of responsibility.
That is astounding. Guideline section 5K2.8 provides the purported legal
basis for the upward departure on the stated ground that the parties agreed that
―the underlying facts relating to the victimization and killing of pit bulls
creat[ed] an aggravating circumstances not adequately taken into account by
the Sentencing Commission.‖85 Who can remember another instance where a
defendant agreed to a nine level increase for conduct not adequately
considered by the guidelines?86

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
―highly
range.‖

See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 56 (emphasis added).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2E1.2(a)(1) (2006).
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 56.
Vick Plea Agreement, supra note 76, at 2.
As noted above, the U.S. Attorney gloated in a press release, albeit, understatedly, that it is
unusual for a defendant to agree to recommend a sentence above the advisory guideline
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Vick and his lawyers appear to have been caught up in the hysteria over
the animal abuse allegations and simply assumed incarceration could not be
avoided.87 In any event, Vick‘s lawyers did not fight the issue, agreeing to the
appropriateness of, and thus ensuring, incarceration. This was curious, to say
the least. Post-Booker, defense lawyers almost always zealously argue for
creative non-incarceration sentencing alternatives except, perhaps, for the
most violent and recidivist offenders. And defense lawyers routinely, and
often successfully, oppose government attempts to invoke section 5K2 to
increase sentences under far weaker circumstances than Vick faced.88
In fact, a plausible argument can be made that no upward departure was
justified. At the outset, the pertinent Guidelines commentary cautions that
―inasmuch as the Commission has continued to monitor and refine the
guidelines since their inception to determine the most appropriate weight to be
accorded . . . aggravating circumstances specified in the guidelines, it is
expected that [such departures for factors not adequately taken into
consideration] will occur rarely and only in exceptional cases.‖89 Surely,
arguments against an upward departure could have been made here.
The government press release indicated that Vick‘s upward departure was
based exclusively on the particularly ―heinous, cruel and inhumane‖ killing of
dogs.90 This reads like an alleged aggravating factor in a death penalty case.
Serial killers and axe murderers rarely make such a concession.
Numerous arguments can be made that this situation was contemplated by
the Guidelines and that the sentencing commission made a conscientious
decision that an increase for ―heinous and cruel‖ conduct applies only to
human victims. In other words, Vick‘s case arguably did not present an
unexpected, exceptional situation where an upward departure was warranted.
However, by agreeing to the multilevel increase for ―heinous‖ conduct, Vick
could not object in principle or otherwise refute the legal arguments of the
animal rights groups that the dogs be treated like human victims. This means
that the legal predicate to increase his sentence far above twelve months had
87. Not to make light of the significant animal cruelty present in this case, it is still worth noting
that animal rights groups reacted with their expected extreme passion. Sometimes, that results in
overreaction and loss of perspective. Criminal justice interests are usually best served when
momentary passions subside. An illustrative example of overreaction by animal rights groups can be
seen when President Obama swatted a fly during a television interview. PETA condemned the action
as an ―execution.‖ D.L. Stewart, The Swat Heard Round the World, FLORIDA TODAY, July 7, 2009,
at 2D; PETA Miffed at President Obama‟s Fly „Execution,‟ REUTERS.COM, June 18, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/18/us-politico-peta-idUSTRE55H4Z220090618.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2006) (reversing sentence that
enhanced by eight times maximum Guidelines sentence).
89. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0, cmt. n.3(B)(i) (2010).
90. News Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 44.
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been effectively conceded, and many of the following defense arguments were
effectively foreclosed.
Yet, there could have been much to argue. First, as unseemly and
politically incorrect as it sounds,91 the ―heinous‖ dog torture involved in
Vick‘s case was not unusual. Undercover dogfighting investigations reveal
that dogfighters often brutally ―execute‖ underperforming dogs because they
feel some sort of personal betrayal.92 Thus, the animal cruelty allegations in
Vick‘s case were not outside of the ―heartland‖ of similar cases.
Second, Guideline provisions sections 5K2.1 and 2 permit an upward
departure for death or serious physical injury. However, those provisions have
been carefully crafted to apply to human victims only. Although the dogs are
certainly ―victims‖ in an ordinary sense, they arguably do not qualify as
victims for the purposes of the federal Sentencing Guidelines.
This point is further amplified by comparison to other key Guidelines,
which contain essentially a default provision where ―society‖ is considered the
victim in situations where there are no human victims. For example, in
applying the critical Guidelines mechanism for ―grouping‖ closely related
counts, ―‗victim‘ is not intended to include indirect or secondary victims . . .
[and in circumstances where] there is no identifiable [human] victim[], the
‗victim‘ . . . is the societal interest that is harmed.‖ 93 Thus, in Vick‘s case, the
relevant societal interest harmed for Guidelines purposes would be the harm
that flows from illegal gambling and dogfighting enterprises—which, after all,
were the underlying offenses in the conspiracy charge for which Vick was
convicted. Vick could have presented a forceful argument that the Sentencing
Commission considered all situations and that there was no room to argue that
cruelty to canines was a separate unaddressed harm that could warrant an
upward departure. Again, given that Vick was not prosecuted for federal
animal cruelty, this conclusion is neither surprising nor unreasonable.
Analysis of other pertinent Guidelines further supports that conclusion.
For example, the applicable Guidelines section 2E1.2 provides that a Travel
Act violation base offense level is the greater of base offense level six or the

91.
See, e.g., Alan Dershowitz, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 145 (1996) (―[a] zealous defense attorney has professional a obligation to
take every legal and ethically permissible step that will serve the client‘s best interest—even if the
attorney finds the step personally distasteful‖); A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS, DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 4-1.6(b) (2006) (―All such qualified lawyers should stand ready to undertake the defense of an
accused regardless of public hostility toward the accused or personal distaste for the offense charged
or the person of the defendant‖).
92. See Paul Duggan, A Blood Sport Exposed: Vick‟s Case Puts Dogfighting Culture in the
Spotlight, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2007, at A1.
93. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D1.2, cmt. n.2 (2010).
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base offense level for the underlying unlawful activity. 94 In other words, the
Commission took into account the myriad of ways a Travel Act violation
could occur and set forth a procedure that required the selection of the highest
possible base offense level—thus, making it even less likely that any
circumstance not adequately considered that would support an even greater
increase in the offense level would be found to exist.
Lastly, the Commission authorized increases for damage to property
where it saw fit. For example, arson, a common Travel Act predicate, includes
a graduated sentencing structure that contemplates various offense level
increases for destruction of property and substantial risk of death.95 However,
for the Travel Act predicate applicable to this case, as discussed below, the
Commission chose not to add increases for destruction of property or other
cruel or violent acts. As crass and unpopular as it sounds, Vick destroyed his
own property.96
What was the appropriate underlying activity to establish Vick‘s proper
base offense level? The Guidelines direct the use of the most analogous state
law guideline where, as here, the unlawful activity that constitutes the Travel
Act violation is a state crime.97 The state law gambling prong of the charged
Travel Act conspiracy should have been used because it is a felony and the
other prong of the charged conspiracy was grounded on a federal
misdemeanor. Thus, the applicable Guideline to establish the base offense
level was not section 2E1.2 (level six), as apparently contemplated by the plea
agreement, but section 2E3.1(1).
Gambling offenses are base level six for ―simple‖ gambling offenses. It is
base level twelve where the conduct was engaging in a gambling business or
94. Id. at § 2E1.2(a)(1)-(2).
95. See id. at § 2K1.4.
96. Some jurisdictions have tried to elevate the status of pets. For example, West Hollywood,
California and Boulder, Colorado recently have passed ordinances that characterize pet owners as
―guardians.‖ See Wendy Underhill, Coming To Terms: Animal Ordinance Sparks a Doggone Debate,
BOULDER MAGAZINE, Fall 2000, at 29. These ordinances are generally seen as efforts to inspire
better treatment of animals. See Ambuja Rosen, Dogs in Chains: If We Stop Calling Dogs Our
Property, Will They Become More Liberated?, DOGS TODAY, Aug. 2000, at 39 (suggesting use of
more loving personal terms will inspire better treatment of pets). However, the essential nature of the
pet remains a species of personal property. See Ortiz, supra note 3, at 28. A recent Oregon lawsuit is
illustrative. A man ran over a dog as part of a dispute between neighbors. The aggrieved dog owner
sued for 1.6 million dollars, alleging loss of companionship. The case was thrown out when the judge
ruled that ―nothing in Oregon law would allow the [plaintiff] to ask the jury to treat [the dog] as
anything other than property.‖ Jessica Golden, Judge Says Pet is Property, Not Companion,
ABCNEWS.COM, May 25, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=2005581&page=1. For a
discussion on various recent efforts by animal protection attorneys to ―push[] the law to treat animals
more like humans,‖ see Anna Stolley Persky, Their Day in Court, 96 A.B.A. J. 54 (Sept. 2010).
97. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X5.1 (2010).

KURLAND (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE PROSECUTI ON OF M ICHAEL VI CK

7/15/2011 10:23 AM

491

part of a commercial gambling operation.98 That squarely fits this case. The
indictment, plea agreement, and statement of facts specifically detail the
defendant‘s involvement in a ―business enterprise involving gambling,‖ thus
qualifying for the level twelve designation.
This could have created problems at the sentencing that redounded to
Vick‘s detriment. If the court determined on its own (as it was free to do) that
the appropriate base offense level was twelve, all bets could have been off. If
the court then ―followed‖ the recommendation of the plea agreement in part
and increased by nine levels for ―heinous‖ conduct, Vick‘s offense level
would have ballooned to level twenty-one, a thirty-seven to forty-six month
sentence, without even taking into account the more extreme positions
advocated by the animal rights groups to raise the offense level through
upward departure mechanisms.
However, this analysis actually lends further support that no increase for
heinous conduct was warranted and that Vick should not have agreed to a
nine-level upward adjustment. As noted above, at base offense level twelve,
the Commission chose not to increase gambling offenses for any related
violence or property destruction that might accompany the operation of a
gambling enterprise.
Lastly, at the time of Vick‘s offense, Congress had made the depiction of
animal cruelty a federal felony if such depiction was intended to be placed in
interstate commerce.99 There was no specific Guideline for this offense, thus
requiring resort to the ―most analogous‖ Guideline. Arguably, the most
analogous Guideline may well have been trafficking in obscene matter, which
includes an upward adjustment ―[i]f the offense involved material that portrays
sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence . . . .‖100
Again, this illustrates that the Commission acted clearly when it deemed it
appropriate to consider possible increases for violent conduct. Its silence with
respect to the Guidelines applicable to Vick‘s offense was no oversight.
This may seem like a cold-hearted analysis. However, sentencing issues
have been analyzed in this manner since the inception of the Guidelines.
Applying long-recognized interpretive techniques is routinely and
emphatically used by defense lawyers to argue that a particular circumstance
was adequately considered by the Guidelines—such arguments were present
here—and militated against any upward departure.
All told, the nine-point increase was legally unwarranted. Vick should
98. Id. at § 2E3.1(a)(1).
99. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 48 (1999). The statute was recently held unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds. See generally United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
100. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G3.1(b)(4).
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have been a base offense level twelve, derived from the illegal gambling
offense and should have received a two-point reduction for acceptance of
responsibility.101 That would have placed him as offense level ten, in Zone B,
where prison would not be mandatory, and if all of his appellate rights had
been preserved, any increase in offense level that resulted in a sentence of
incarceration could have been challenged on appeal.
Thus, from Vick‘s standpoint, he gained nothing from his unusual
concession that a nine-point increase was appropriate. The district court was
free to, and did, ignore the joint-sentence recommendation of just twelve to
eighteen months. Vick received a twenty-three-month federal sentence—
almost double the low end of the sentence recommendation as per the plea
agreement, and the judge also ordered that Vick foot the bill for almost
$900,000 to be used to attempt to rehabilitate the pit bull terriers.102 This was
an extraordinarily harsh monetary penalty and prison term. Of course, Vick
also missed the entire 2007 and 2008 football seasons, lost millions of dollars
in salary and endorsements, and was still subject to state prosecution. By most
objective measurements, Vick‘s legal strategy failed miserably.103
III. ARE WE DONE YET? LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF A
SUCCESSIVE STATE PROSECUTION
Vick‘s travails with the legal system were not over. Vick was
subsequently indicted on additional related state felony dogfighting and animal
cruelty charges. These charges could have resulted in additional state prison
time and created additional obstacles when Vick sought to enter a federal
halfway house near the completion of his federal sentence.
Vick eventually pled guilty to one felony charge of illegally promoting a
dogfight and received a concurrent sentence.104 But that outcome was not a
foregone conclusion, and he faced significant additional legal peril. As noted
above, the Virginia trial court had discretion to impose either a consecutive or

101. The candor evident by accepting this level twelve offense for a gambling offense may have
had other positive spillover benefits, as Vick may have avoided his subsequent conduct that the court
relied on to find lack of candor and thus no acceptance of responsibility.
102. This restitution term was also part of the plea agreement where Vick agreed to ―make
restitution for the full amount of the costs associated with the disposition . . . [and long term care] of
[the subject] dogs . . . .‖ Vick Plea Agreement, supra note 76, at 4.
103. It came as no surprise that, shortly after the resolution of the federal case, Vick fired one of
his lawyers. Vick Sheds One of His Lawyers in Dogfighting Case, ESPN.COM, Nov. 9, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3102721.
104. Plea to State Dogfighting Charges Makes Vick Eligible for Halfway House, ESPN.COM,
Nov. 25, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3725060 [hereinafter Plea to State
Dogfighting Charges].
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concurrent state sentence.105 In addition, the state conviction was not
consequence-free. Vick was saddled with an additional year of probation
supervision and was now a federal and state felon. Finally, in the frantic
activity to have Vick serve the last few months of his federal sentence in a
halfway house (necessary to facilitate his opportunity to play professional
football in 2009), Vick apparently belatedly learned that federal prison
regulations prohibited a defendant with unresolved pending charges from
entering a federal halfway house. This meant that Vick could not challenge
the validity of the state charges if he wanted prompt entry into the halfway
house. As discussed below, challenging the legal validity of the subsequent
state charges would be time consuming and would have prevented prompt
entry into the federal ―Community Corrections Center‖ halfway house
program, which was necessary if Vick had any realistic chance of being
reinstated and playing in the 2009 NFL season.
As noted above, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution provides no protection to bar the state prosecution. The Supreme
Court has long held that, under the dual sovereignty doctrine, federal and state
charges, even if based on the same underlying conduct, do not constitute the
―same offense.‖106
In addition, as also noted above, only an ironic twist of circumstances
created the predicament of additional state charges. First, had Vick been
prosecuted by state authorities at the outset, no federal prosecution likely
would have ever commenced. If Vick was going to plead guilty, he should
have promptly worked out an agreement with state authorities. Such a
resolution, which probably could have been attained with a large fine and
minimal, if any, incarceration, would almost certainly have been sufficient to
ward off federal prosecution. This is how the case should have been resolved.
Of course, Vick‘s lack of candor, his arrogance, and his initial reluctance to
plead guilty derailed and sidetracked initial state prosecution and made the
most appropriate outcome problematic.107
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-308.1 (2010).
106. See KURLAND, supra note 62, at 54 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299
(1932)).
107. In an interview for the CBS television program 60 Minutes, conducted while Vick was in
prison, Vick belatedly acknowledged that lying to the police, the team owner, and the NFL
Commissioner was a monumental mistake:
I was scared. I knew my career was in jeopardy. I knew I had an endorsement with Nike
and --and I knew it was going to be a big letdown. I felt the guilt and I knew I was guilty,
and I knew what I had done. And not knowing at the time that, you know, actually telling
the truth may have beenbetter than, you know, not being honest. And it backfired on me
tremendously.

KURLAND (DO NOT DELETE)

494

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

7/15/2011 10:23 AM

[Vol. 21:2

Second, even with the reality of the federal prosecution, after such
prosecution results in a conviction, especially one that results in a substantial
prison sentence relative to the offense, the state usually forgoes prosecution
for the same general conduct as a matter of discretion. If the offender is
already going to federal prison, state officials usually determine not to
unnecessarily expend additional finite state resources that, in essence,
duplicate the same result.108
However, the normal rules did not operate here. Based largely on
perceived public outrage and perception concerns of how foolish the local
prosecutor looked in the public eye, state charges were brought against Vick
even after he pled guilty in federal court. This was highly unusual, though not
unprecedented and not necessarily legally improper.
To what degree ―public outrage‖ and how it is measured should influence
the policy decision whether to bring additional state charges poses an
interesting question, particularly where the federal charges were brought
largely because the State was initially unwilling to prosecute in the first
instance. The local prosecutor‘s pronouncements that the state charges
―focused on different crimes‖ only begged the question and were specious in
any event, particularly in light of his candid acknowledgement that ―[m]ost of
the matters that I‘m presenting [to the local grand jury] have already been
admitted in sworn statements authored by the defendants in the federal
proceedings.‖109
There is more than a whiff of unfairness here. As noted above, the federal
government prosecuted Vick largely because the State was, in the first
instance, unwilling to do so. And, as explained above, as a practical matter,
the almost exclusive predicate for Vick‘s federal prison time was animal
cruelty, which is not, strictly speaking, a federal offense. Given this situation,
it seems particularly unfair that the State chose to pursue additional
dogfighting and animal cruelty state charges based on the same conduct, even
Interview by James Brown with Michael Vick on 60 Minutes, (aired Aug. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.ajc.com/sports/michael-vicks-60-minutes-116871.html. In a BET interview, Vick also
commented that he thought, at first, his fame and fortune would buy him out of any significant
trouble. The above comments also raise additional issues concerning what, if any, legal counsel he
received in the critical formative moments when the facts first started to emerge.
108. The state prosecutor was concerned about the financial cost of the state prosecution and, at
one point, stated that he was determined to wait until Vick had served his entire federal sentence
before commencing the state trial in order to save the money that would be required to transfer Vick
from federal custody in Leavenworth, Kansas to stand trial in Surry County, Virginia. Prosecutor:
Vick‟s Virginia Dogfighting Trial Can Wait Until Release From Prison, ESPN.COM, June 11, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3434547.
109. Hank Kurz Jr., Prosecutor Says He‟ll Seek Indictments in Case at Vick Property,
ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, Sept. 25, 2007, at Bus. News.
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after Vick was sentenced to prison on the federal charges. Surely Vick‘s
federal sentence adequately vindicated any conceivable state prosecutorial
interest. However, those are policy, not legal, questions. Did Vick have any
legal options available?
Had the State prosecuted first, the United States Department of Justice
internal ―Petite Policy‖ would have been consulted to determine whether
additional federal charges were appropriate.110 That determination would
have turned on whether the resolution of the state case—be it acquittal,
conviction, or minimal sentence—would have left substantial federal interests
demonstrably unvindicated.111
The Petite Policy wisely provides a rebuttable presumption that the fair
and competent prosecution of similar charges in state court adequately
vindicates the federal interest regardless of result. A strong argument could be
made that, even had Vick received a lenient state sentence, even straight
probation, no substantial federal interest would have been left demonstrably
unvindicated, and hence, no federal prosecution would have been warranted.
Given that Vick‘s federal dogfighting charges were, when stripped of their
Travel Act conspiracy veneer, misdemeanors where probation is a common
outcome, no substantial federal interest existed in using a federal prosecution
to, in effect, enforce and vindicate Virginia gambling laws. Moreover, no
legally recognized substantial federal interest in local animal cruelty required
vindication by an additional federal prosecution. Accordingly, had the State
prosecution commenced first (as it should have), it would have been a waste of
finite federal prosecutorial resources to undertake a successive federal
prosecution.
Unfortunately for Vick, the State of Virginia has no analogous Petite
Policy, and the local prosecutor possessed unbridled discretion—subject to the
applicable state laws discussed below—whether to pursue state charges, even
after having first passed on an initial opportunity to prosecute.112 The reality
that Vick faced substantial federal incarceration because of animal cruelty—
the most significant state interest at issue—should have informed the judgment
of a rational and fair-minded prosecutor not to bring additional state charges,
110. See generally U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2009). For a discussion of the Petite
Policy, see KURLAND, supra note 62, at 3–18.
111. KURLAND, supra note 62, at 11–15.
112. Some state judges have lamented the general lack of analogous statewide ―Petite‖ policies to
bind all state‘s attorneys within a state. See, e.g., Booth v. State, 436 So. 2d 36, 38 (Fla. 1983) (Erlich,
J., concurring) (recommending that the Florida legislature consider the possible adoption of its own
Petite Policy because Florida‘s scheme of government has no agency analogous to the federal
Department of Justice, with power to formulate prosecutorial policy binding on all states attorneys);
see also KURLAND, supra note 62, at 127.
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even if technically permissible. Again, by all reasonable measures, the state‘s
interest in the prevention of animal cruelty had been more than vindicated by
the federal prosecution and sentence.113
The questionable decision to prosecute can also be seen in the choice of
charges and the curious, if not disingenuous, manner in which the state
charges were drafted. The charges were carefully tailored to minimize the
possibility of legal challenge under what may be characterized as state law
dual sovereignty limitation principles but with little regard to whether they
were necessary to vindicate legitimate, unvindicated prosecutorial interests.
The State presented ten charges to the local six-person grand jury, and the
grand jury returned a true bill of indictment on two of the charges. The grand
jury returned an indictment on the charge of engaging or promoting a dogfight,
in violation of the Virginia Code, section 3.1-796.124(A)(1), (4), and (5), a
class six felony, on April 23, 2007.114 This charge covered essentially the
same conduct alleged in the federal indictment and admitted to as part of the
plea. Despite the local prosecutor‘s statements that the state indictment
represented separate charges not addressed in the federal indictment, the state
charges were carefully crafted with an eye toward the federal indictment, as
well as the pertinent state statutes discussed below. This suggests general
prosecutorial unease concerning the validity of the state charges.
Most notably, the state charge conspicuously omitted reference to Virginia
Code section 3.1-796.124(A)(2), which includes ―wagering‖ on dogfights.
Interestingly, Vick‘s federal indictment specified but one subsection of
Virginia Code 3.1-796.124—the subsection (2) ―wagering‖ provision—
necessary for the Travel Act charge because of the Travel Act‘s statutory
requirement that the state law ―unlawful activity‖ constitute a gambling
offense.115 Despite this conscientious effort that the state indictment not
duplicate citation to any of the specific sections of the Virginia criminal code
set forth in the federal indictment, the state charges indisputably overlapped
113. The local prosecutor essentially conceded this point when he ultimately accepted Vick‘s
guilty plea to one felony count of dogfighting without requiring any additional prison time with the
comment that ―I feel that what I did today is approved by more than a majority of Surry County, and
that‘s the constituency that I‘m concerned about.‖ Plea to State Dogfighting Charges, supra note
104. Of course, whether this odd resort to plebiscite and public opinion is appropriate guidance for
prosecutorial decision-making raises an entirely different issue beyond the scope of this article.
Lastly, it is instructive that Vick pled to a state dogfighting count. The animal cruelty count was
dropped. The only conceivable justification for a state prosecution would be to hold Vick
accountable for actual animal cruelty. However, Vick‘s resolution of the state charges did not even
accomplish that goal. See discussion notes 116–17 and accompanying text, infra.
114. Indictment, Virginia v. Vick, No. 10 (Surry County, Va., Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter State
Indictment].
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6571(B)(3) (2008) (formerly § 3.1-796.124 (A)(2) (2007)).
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with the identical conduct alleged in the federal indictment, even though the
federal charge was drafted as a conspiracy charge.
Vick was also indicted by the state grand jury on one count of cruelty to
animals by ―killing or causing . . . dogs to fight‖ in violation of Virginia Code
section 3.1-796.122(H).116 This count did not allege one discrete act of animal
abuse. Instead, although not denominated a conspiracy charge, it alleged that
the criminal conduct took place in a conspiracy-like duration between 2001
and April 24, 2007.117
Moreover, this count did not allege the killing of any specifically
identified dog and appeared to be pled in the alternative to support a
conviction exclusively on proof that the defendants caused dogs to fight, as
opposed to having to prove the actual killing of a dog. However, the cited
statutory subsection (H) itself includes the independent required element that
the dogs die as a direct result of the conduct. Thus, as indicted, all of the dog
torture, promoting dogfighting, and causing the death of various dogs
allegations were encompassed in one omnibus state law charge—a class six
felony.
The time span for this charge mirrored the time span in the federal
conspiracy charge, whose federal indictment included an allegation that
related to the identical dogfighting and killing allegations.118 The federal
Travel Act conspiracy charge did not reference this state statute because
animal cruelty itself does not constitute the requisite ―unlawful activity‖ as
defined by the Travel Act.119
The local prosecutor also presented eight additional dog-killing charges
under identical section 3.1-796.122(H) to the county grand jury.120 Each
charge alleged the killing of a specific dog on April 23, 2007 and, like the
omnibus section 796.122(H) charge noted above, mirrored the killings of the
same dogs during the same time period identified in the federal indictment.
The alleged dates of the killings were within the time period set forth in the
other state charge, and thus, these counts wholly overlapped with the identical
conduct as charged in the other omnibus count.
Often, a grand jury acts as a rubber stamp and returns indictments for

116. State Indictment, supra note 114, at No. 9.
117. Id.
118. Compare federal indictment para. one, alleging acts from ―early 2001 and continuing
through on or about April 25, 2007,‖ a six-year span that differs by one day with the state charge. See
Federal Indictment, supra note 22.
119. As noted infra, the Travel Act charges referenced state law gambling offenses to meet the
requisite federal statutory definition of unlawful activity.
120. State Indictment, supra note 114, at No. 11, Counts I–VIII.
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every charge presented by the prosecutor.121 Here, the local grand jury
actually preformed its historic role as a bulwark against government
oppression and declined to indict on eight proposed charges concerning the
killings of particular dogs. These charges were not barred by the federal
Double Jeopardy Clause because of the dual sovereignty doctrine.122 Yet, the
grand jury exercised a type of fundamental fairness veto, not to mention a rare
act of true independence, in refusing to authorize additional charges that
reeked of unnecessary duplication—or, to use an apt football term, ―piling
on.‖
The grand jury‘s refusal to indict on the eight specific dog-killing charges
had nothing to do with preventing oppression from the duplication of the
federal prosecution. In all likelihood, that legal concept was not even
addressed at the grand jury. Rather, the grand jury prevented oppression by
refusing to authorize duplicative state charges, which alleged the very same
acts charged under the same state statute but alleged in multiple counts.
Vick‘s counsel could not take credit for this favorable outcome. Under
Virginia law, defense counsel plays no role in how evidence and proposed
charges are presented before the county grand jury, and defense counsel is not
permitted to be present during the proceedings.123
The validity of the two state charges returned by the local grand jury
raised substantial legal questions given the manner in which the state charges
closely mirrored the federal charges and the possible applicability of an
unusual Virginia ―double jeopardy‖ statute. After the federal prosecution,
could any additional state charges be brought under Virginia law based on the
same acts or conduct? Vick‘s lawyers surely must have considered this legal
question before entering into the federal plea, although they expressed some
surprise and ―disappointment‖ when the state charges were first announced.124
Shortly thereafter, to great fanfare, they exclaimed that they would
―aggressively protect [Vick‘s] rights to ensure that he is not held accountable

121. For a general discussion of the contemporary grand jury as merely a ―rubber stamp‖ for the
prosecutor, see, e.g., LARRY GAINES & ROGER MILLER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ACTION 292 (5th ed.
2008).
122. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
123. See 9A MICHIE‘S JURISPRUDENCE OF VA. AND W. VA § 23 (2010) (―The grand jury is a
one-sided proceeding, and before it the accused has no right to appear or to send witnesses . . . . It is
only the state bringing a prosecution . . . and the grand jury has only to say whether, upon the state‘s
showing, the accusation is well made and proper to be tried by the jury.‖); id. at § 23 n.1764
(―putative defendant and his counsel have no constitutional right to be present at and participate in
[state criminal] grand jury proceedings‖).
124. Jerry Markon & Mark Maske, Vick is Indicted on State Charges, WASH. POST, Sept. 26,
2007, at E1, 9.
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for the same conduct twice.‖125 Unfortunately, Vick‘s lawyers ultimately
chose not to fight this legal battle.
Analysis of whether a particular state charge is legally barred under
Virginia law can take place only after particular state charges have been
brought and compared to the relevant federal charges. However, the general
scope of the Virginia statutory prohibition could have been assessed prior to
the actual filing of any particular state charges. Vick should have been
informed prior to entering a guilty plea in federal court that the State would
likely be able to draft various state charges that would not automatically be
barred under Virginia law.126
As noted above, Vick started off at a significant legal disadvantage. His
factual statement to support the federal plea could be used as evidence in any
subsequent state prosecution, assuming a state prosecution was valid.127 Thus,
if the state charges were legally valid, any on-the-merits defense would be
futile, as the state prosecutor recognized when he commented that ―[m]ost of
the matters that I‘m presenting have already been admitted in sworn
statements authored by the defendants in the federal proceedings.‖128
In addition, as noted above, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United
States Constitution provides no protection to bar the state prosecution. The
Supreme Court has long held that, under the dual sovereignty doctrine, federal
and state charges, even if based on the same underlying conduct, do not
constitute the ―same offense.‖
As such, whether Vick‘s state dogfighting and animal cruelty charges
were legally valid raised an intriguing question under Virginia law. Even
though the federal Constitution provides no double jeopardy protection in this
regard, state law could provide additional protection. This is a discrete stateby-state inquiry—and Virginia has enacted a statute that provides a defendant

125. Id. Even before Vick pled guilty to the federal indictment, the press widely reported that
additional state charges were likely. Jerry Markon, Vick Likely Will Face More Charges in Va.,
WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2007, at E7.
126. The blogosphere was not particularly kind to Vick‘s lawyers on this point. For example,
several bloggers on a Wall Street Journal cite criticized Vick‘s lawyers‘ seemingly inexplicable
oversight in not resolving any potential state charges before entering into the federal plea agreement.
Posting of Peter Lattman to Michael Vick & the “Dual Sovereignty” Doctrine,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/09/25/michael-vick-the-dual-sovereignty-doctrine/ (Sept. 25, 2007,
16:59 EST). One representative post stated, ―Vick‘s lawyers screwed up . . . [T]ruly experienced
criminal defense lawyers know . . . if you don‘t get sign off from the State, you are at risk when
making a federal plea deal.‖ Posting of Shoddy Work to Michael Vick & the “Dual Sovereignty”
Doctrine, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/09/25/michael-vick-the-dual-sovereignty-doctrine/ (Sept. 25,
2007, 18:15 EST).
127. See KURLAND, supra note 62, at 318–19.
128. Kurz, supra note 109.
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with some protection from some ―successive‖ prosecutions based on the same
acts at issue in a prior federal prosecution.
First, the Virginia Constitution contains a clause similar to the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.129 Most state courts
interpret ―analogous‖ state constitutional provisions in an identical manner as
their United States Constitution counterparts as a matter of course, and thus,
most states categorically provide no double jeopardy protection as a result of
the dual sovereignty doctrine.130
However, Virginia courts have not endorsed the dual sovereignty principle
in this manner. Instead, Virginia courts have held that the particular statutes
involved must be analyzed to determine whether the federal and state statutes
contain identical statutory elements.131 Presumably, if the statutes are
identical, the Virginia double jeopardy clause might bar the subsequent
prosecution as a matter of Virginia law.
However, because Vick‘s federal conspiracy charge necessarily included
different statutory elements than the substantive Virginia dogfighting and
animal cruelty charges, and vice versa, the Virginia double jeopardy clause in
the state constitution, even if interpreted to provide more protection than the
federal Double Jeopardy Clause, would not bar these particular charges
(although it might bar, for example, a state conspiracy prosecution).
However, the legal inquiry is not over. Virginia Code section 19.2-294
provides in relevant part that ―if the same act be a violation of . . . a state and a
federal statute, a prosecution under the federal statute shall be a bar to a
prosecution under the state statute.‖132 In contrast to the double jeopardy
129. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides, in relevant part, that ―[a person may] not be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense.‖
130. See, e.g., Booth v. State, 436 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1983). The doctrine is in a state of flux in the
state courts. The Michigan Supreme Court recently overruled prior precedent where it had previously
interpreted the state constitutional double jeopardy clause more broadly than its identical federal
counterpart to bar some state prosecutions and adopted the majority view holding the two provisions
should be interpreted in an identical manner. People v. Davis, 695 N.W.2d 45 (Mich. 2005). The
case is discussed in detail at Nicholas P. Grippo, Double Jeopardy Clause—The Michigan Supreme
Court Holds that Successive Prosecutions for the Same Criminal Acts Does Not Violate the State‟s
Double Jeopardy Clause. People v. Davis, 695 N.W.2d 45 (Mich. 2005), 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1301
(2006). For a complete state-by-state analysis, see KURLAND, supra note 62, at 89-209.
131. See, e.g., Epps v. Virginia, 216 S.E.2d 64, 67–68 (Va. 1975).
132. The full statute provides
If the same act be a violation of two or more statutes, or of two or more ordinances, or of
one or more statutes and also one or more ordinances, conviction under one of such
statutes or ordinances shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or
others. Furthermore, if the same act be a violation of both a state and a federal statute, a
prosecution under the federal statute shall be a bar to a prosecution under the state
statute. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any offense involving an act of
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clause of the Virginia Constitution, which focuses on whether the two charges
constitute the ―same offense,‖ this statute is, by its express terms, broader and
focused on whether the ―same act‖ violates both state and federal law. This, in
turn, requires a legal analysis of what exactly is meant by the term ―same act.‖
The relevant legislative history suggests the Virginia statute was based
upon policy considerations that sought to prohibit a successive state
prosecution broadly based on the same conduct that was at issue in the prior
federal prosecution.133 The statute is unusual among state law dual
sovereignty limitation statutes because, by its express terms, it seeks to limit
state prosecutions only after a federal prosecution—it has no application to a
Virginia prosecution that follows a prosecution by another state. ―Whether a
Virginia prosecution is barred is determined by a two-part inquiry. First, the
federal prosecution must be commenced prior to the Virginia prosecution . . . .
Second, the court must determine whether the prosecutions are violations of
the ‗same act.‘‖134
At least one Virginia court has set forth a test that could be read to prohibit
Vick‘s state prosecution. In Hall v. Commonwealth,135 the Virginia Court of
Appeals, in interpreting the relevant ―same act‖ statutory language, stated the
following: ―In determining whether the conduct underlying the convictions is
based upon the ‗same act,‘ the particular criminal transaction must be
examined to determine whether the acts are the same in terms of time, situs,
victim, and the nature of the act itself.‖136 Equally as important, the relevant
legislative history unmistakably indicates that the statute was meant to codify
the expansive, pro-defendant, protective principles subsequently articulated in
Grady v. Corbin,137 a short-lived United States Supreme Court case that
potentially radically recast and expanded the protections of the federal Double
Jeopardy Clause.
In its brief life, Grady v. Corbin was hailed by the defense bar as a great

terrorism as defined in §18.2-46.4.
For the purposes of this section, a prosecution under a federal statute shall be deemed to
be commenced once jeopardy has attached.

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (2010) (amended 2003) (emphasis added).
133. See generally KURLAND, supra note 62, at 268–71 (describing Virginia cases that discuss
legislative history).
134. Id. at 268–69.
135. Hall v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 455 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
136. Id. at 459.
137. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688
(1993).
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triumph in the annals of criminal justice.138 Thus, the statute embodies a
broader concept than a technical ―same elements‖ analysis, which sensibly sets
forth an application that avoids an interpretation of the statute that would be
superfluous with the state constitutional provision and, thus, renders the statute
nugatory and without independent force.
As applied to Vick‘s case, the key legal question is whether overt acts in
furtherance of a conspiracy admitted to as part of the federal plea agreement—
although not essential to establish a necessary element of the offense139—
constitute the ―same act‖ as those virtually identical overt acts charged as state
substantive offenses.140 If so—and that is a logical reading of the statute and
its legislative history—this would seem to operate in Vick‘s favor and should
have barred any subsequent state prosecution for dogfighting and specific acts
of animal cruelty based on the killing of dogs that were overt acts and in some
manner part of the ―means of the conspiracy‖ in the federal prosecution.
Significantly, Virginia courts do not summarily reject the proposition that a
conspiracy charge and a substantive charge can qualify as the ―same act‖
under the statute.
138. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Buckels, The Double Jeopardy Clause: “There Shall Not Rise Up a
Double Affliction”, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 1991, at 22, 25 (Grady [dramatically] established that, ―as
a matter of constitutional law, the accused now enjoys the greatest degree of protection from multiple
trials for the same conduct ever accorded‖); George C. Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act Approach to
Double Jeopardy Same Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1039 (1995) (describing the Grady
test as fine-grained and highly practical).
139. Often, in determining whether two charges constitute the same offense, a conspiracy charge
is summarily deemed a different act than a substantive offense, which is the object of the conspiracy
based on cursory application of the hornbook legal principle that the gravamen of the conspiracy is
the ―agreement,‖ not the completed offense. See generally, WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 621–
22 (4th ed. 2003) (―agreement itself is the requisite act‖). However, the federal conspiracy statute, 18
U.S.C. §371 requires the commission of an overt act as an additional statutory element, so the instant
legal inquiry must go farther, and the legal status and consequences of alleging particular overt acts
must be considered. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2011).
140. Here, the similarity between the federal conspiracy charge and the state offenses is
peculiarly overwhelming. First, the abused dogs described in the federal indictment are identical to
the victim dogs identified in the state charges. Second, the scope of the federal conspiracy ran from
2001 to April 25, 2007. The state animal cruelty charges, which normally would have identified one
discrete act that occurred on or about a particular day, were drafted with a conspiracy-like duration
spanning 2001 to April 24, 2007—a technical trivial difference of one day that was solely intended to
avoid the statutory bar. This type of disingenuous charge drafting should not escape the ―non-rigid‖
common sense application of the statute endorsed by most Virginia courts. Other reported cases
arguably favorable to the government are not controlling. See e.g., Bolton v. Commonwealth, 451
S.E. 2d 687, 689–91 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (court again emphasized that specific factors are not rigidly
applied, dismissed two conspiracy counts, but permitted one conspiracy charge to stand, emphasizing
the presence of different co-conspirators and different time frame by two years); Billington v.
Commonwealth, 412 S.E.2d 461, 463–64 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding validity of successive
prosecution even with presence of overlapping overt acts, relying in large part on presence of
different victims).
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The existence of this statute explains why state prosecutors, out of an
abundance of caution, steered clear of indicting Vick on any state gambling
charges in light of the fact that the relevant Virginia gambling statutes were
specifically referenced in the federal indictment as the requisite ―unlawful
activity‖ to support the Travel Act charge. Had the local prosecutors done so,
Vick‘s chances of invoking the Virginia statute to void the state charges would
have been greatly enhanced.
However, even acknowledging that the state charges were carefully
drafted to avoid the most blatant violation of the statutory ―double jeopardy‖
protections, a fair reading of the statute would appear to give broader
preclusive application as well. The preclusive effect of the statute is geared
toward defining, in a common sense, ―non-rigid‖ application, the totality of
the transaction in determining whether the state charge encompasses the same
criminal act or transaction. As noted above, the state animal abuse charge was
drafted to mirror the federal conspiracy charge in duration and scope, even
down to the torture and killing of the identical dogs as referenced in both the
federal and state indictments. The state charge need not have been drawn in
such a ―conspiracy-like‖ manner. Additionally, the state dogfighting
promotion charge similarly mirrored the interstate sponsoring of dogfighting
prong of the federal charge.
Not surprisingly, Virginia courts have historically been stingy in
interpreting the statute in the defendant‘s favor.141 The courts also sometimes
resort to pro-prosecution procedural machinations, where some decisions
favorable to the defense are designated as ―not for official citation,‖ although
they can be located in computerized databases.142 Thus, Vick prevailing on a
state law challenge was far from a certainty. Nevertheless, the Virginia
Supreme Court has not rendered a definitive interpretation of the statute. As
applied to Vick‘s case, the most reasonable interpretation of the statute would
hold that the charged federal conspiracy constituted the ―same act‖ as the
charged state law substantive offenses, thus barring the state prosecution in its
entirety.
As noted above, this interpretation also squares with a reasonable
understanding of the relevant legislative history, which indicates the statute
was designed to provide a defendant with more protection than the limited
protection available from a narrow Blockburger ―same elements‖ test, which
appears to be the state constitutional standard. In such circumstances, the

141. See e.g., Bolton, 451 S.E.2d at 689–91; Billington, 412 S.E.2d at 463–64.
142. See, e.g., Slade v. Commonwealth, No. 2664-98-3, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 514 (Va. Ct. App.
July 18, 2000) (unlawful discharge of firearm charge deemed ―same act‖ as subsequent prosecution
for animal cruelty and thus barred under statute).
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statutory enactment should be interpreted in a manner so as not to make it
merely superfluous with the state constitutional provision.143
Unfortunately, as noted above, Vick chose not to challenge the state
charges on this ground despite the well-publicized initial bravado by counsel
that they would do so. Thus, with the decision not to contest the charges on
this ground and Vick‘s admissions as part of the federal plea, his guilt on the
state charges—and the possibility of additional consecutive time—was a
foregone conclusion.
Vick was also fortunate, if not downright lucky. Having taken no
proactive steps to protect himself from a subsequent state prosecution and
quickly entering federal prison in the hopes of speedily serving his sentence so
he could be eligible to play in 2009, Vick seemingly was unaware that pending
unresolved state charges would prohibit his entry into the halfway house
program.144 Thus, when the state charges were filed, Vick ultimately had to
forgo meritorious legal challenges because litigating those issues would take
up a considerable amount of time—and the state charges would have remained
pending and unresolved.145
In this procedural posture, the State had Vick over the proverbial barrel.
Vick had to resolve the state charges from a position of considerable weakness
and desperation. Luckily, the state prosecutor was willing to resolve the
charges without requiring additional jail time. The state prosecutor agreed to
accept a plea where Vick would plead guilty to the dogfighting charge and the
animal cruelty charge would be dismissed.146
Vick pled guilty to the one state felony and received a suspended sentence
that added one additional year of probation.147 This is a ―great‖ result only if
one ignores the fact that the twenty-three-month sentence was oppressive and

143. Most of the reported Virginia lower court decisions that rule against the defendant seem to
interpret the statute unduly narrow and embod a technical ―Blockburger‖ same elements test. See,
e.g., Londono v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 641,649 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (federal possession and
drug conspiracy conviction do not bar subsequent state prosecution for transporting same drugs into
state because acts that made up federal charge occurred within the state, while Virginia charge
occurred the moment illegal drugs penetrated the borders of the Commonwealth); see also Bolton,
451 S.E.2d at 689–91; Billington, 412 S.E.2d at 463–64.
144. See discussion supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
145. As noted above, the state prosecutor had indicated a preference to wait until Vick completed
his entire federal sentence before commencing with the state prosecution because of the financial
impact to the county. See Prosecutor: Vick‟s Virginia Dogfighting Trial, supra note 108.
146. See Mark Maske, Vick Pleads Guilty to State Charge, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Nov. 25,
2008, http://views,washingtonpost.com/theleague/nflnewsfeed2008/11 (describing Vick‘s guilty plea
to state dogfighting charge, dropping of animal cruelty charge, and imposition of three-year
suspended sentence).
147. Id.
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should have never been imposed in the first place and also ignores the fact that
the state prosecution should have been prevented in its entirety.
In any event, the prosecutorial decision to permit the case to be resolved
on these terms exposes the absurdity of the entire prosecution. The prosecutor
was so intent on bringing additional state charges but was willing to resolve
them without insisting on any additional prison time. Even more perplexing,
the State agreed to drop the animal cruelty charge as part of the plea
agreement. Yet, the only conceivable justification for the state prosecution
was to hold Vick criminally accountable for an actual animal cruelty offense—
a result that the federal prosecution did not, and could not, accomplish.
However, the State case spectacularly failed to accomplish this objective. By
permitting Vick to plead to a single state dogfighting charge, the state
prosecution needlessly duplicated the federal prosecution and vindicated no
distinct state interest. Any objective analysis must conclude that the entire
state case was misguided, wasteful, pointless, and unfair.
In any event, this action cleared the way for Vick‘s entry into a federal
halfway house to complete the last few months of his sentence. All that
awaited was his reinstatement in the NFL and for a team to sign him.
Vick, for his part, quickly took the predictable first step in his long road to
rehabilitation in the immediate aftermath of his federal plea. Much like
―Alex,‖ the central character in Stanley Kubrick‘s cinematic masterpiece, ―A
Clockwork Orange,‖ who underwent brief but intense aversion therapy to
ostensibly rid himself of a lifelong attraction to extreme violence,148 Vick
claimed to have been immediately transformed. Despite a lifetime affinity for
and substantial cultural immersion in all things dogfighting, Vick intoned that
―[d]ogfighting . . . is a terrible thing.‖149 Pundits and celebrities alike attested
to Vick‘s sincerity and immediate rehabilitation. NFL Commissioner Goodell
reinstated Vick for the 2009 season, subject to a six-week suspension at the

148. See A Clockwork Orange, Plot Overview, SPARKNOTES.COM, http://www.sparknotes.com/
lit/clockworkorange/summary.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
One day, after fighting with and killing a cellmate, Alex is selected as the first candidate
for an experimental treatment called Ludovico‘s Technique, a form of brainwashing that
incorporates associative learning. After being injected with a substance that makes him
dreadfully sick, the doctors force Alex to watch exceedingly violent movies. In this way,
Alex comes to associate violence with the nausea and headaches he experiences from the
shot. The process takes two weeks to complete, after which the mere thought of violence
has the power to make Alex ill. Id.

149. Jerry Markon & Jonathan Mummolo, Vick Pleads Guilty, Calls Dogfighting a Terrible
Thing, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2007, at A1.

KURLAND (DO NOT DELETE)

506

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

7/15/2011 10:23 AM

[Vol. 21:2

outset of the season, which was subsequently reduced to two games.150
This was hailed as a victory in some quarters. However, as noted above,
his lengthy incarceration cost him the 2007 and 2008 seasons and virtually all
of his considerable fortune. This seems excessive and the product of odd,
indeed questionable, legal representation, as well as questionable prosecutorial
discretion on all fronts.151 If nothing else, Vick‘s case stands as an important
objective lesson in the perils and pitfalls of successive prosecutions. The case
may offer some other important, albeit less apparent, lessons as well.
IV. LEAGUE DISCIPLINE: EMERGING EVIDENTIARY LESSONS FROM VICK‘S
PROSECUTIONS
Although Vick‘s case may not leave a lasting mark on federal dogfighting
prosecutions or substantially change how society values canine life (although
early, largely anecdotal evidence seems to be slightly tipping in a positive
direction), it may emerge as a harbinger concerning the modern professional
athlete‘s dilemma over how to navigate the often competing strategies and
goals concerning preparation of a sound criminal defense and ―cooperation
with a commissioner‖ inquiry to determine whether particular conduct should
result in a league suspension. The present contours of the issue are relatively
new and just beginning to emerge, at least as far as professional football is
concerned, because the NFL substantially altered key procedural aspects of its
Personal Conduct Policy in 2007.
To some extent, the challenges of balancing competing interests of
criminal defendants are not entirely new. Defense counsel representing
politicians have long had to deal with clients who insisted that their political
viability be factored into decisions concerning their criminal defense, often
interfering with otherwise sound criminal defense strategy.152
150. Vick recently completed a phenomenal 2010 season where he led the Philadelphia Eagles to
a division championship and received a Pro Bowl selection based on a league wide vote of players,
coaches, and fans. See Gregory, supra note 12.
151. The length of the prison term seems excessive for the reasons noted above, a legal view not
diminished by Vick‘s post-release comments that prison was ―the best thing . . . that ever happened to
me.‖ Posting of Mike Florio to Pro Football Talk: Vick Calls Prison “The Best Thing That Ever
Happened to Me‖, http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/10/03/vick-calls-prison-the-best-thingthat-ever-happened-to-me/ (Oct. 3, 2010, 11:18 EDT). Moreover, Vick, upon later reflection,
subsequently amplified his earlier comment and suggested that six months incarceration likely would
have been sufficient. Peter King, Back to Prison With Michael Vick, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 28,
2011 at 18.
152. A common problem concerns a defendant politician wishing to testify to maintain electoral
viability even if sound defense strategy indicates otherwise. See, e.g., Boris Kostelanetz, White
Collar Crime: The Defendant‟s Side, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL: A PRIMER FOR TRIAL LAWYERS
1048, 1056 (2d ed.
1989) (arguing that generally a white collar defendant should not testify). For
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Vick‘s lack of candor at the outset of the criminal investigation put him in
poor graces with the prosecutors, who unsurprisingly viewed his lack of
candor as lying, if not outright obstruction. This hampered Vick‘s opportunity
for a lenient resolution from the criminal justice system and effectively
eliminated the possibility that the matter could be resolved utilizing
noncriminal prosecution alternatives. Vick also hurt his case with the
Commissioner by similarly lying about his involvement in dogfighting. As
noted above, Vick appeared to have been primarily concerned that his
involvement with dogfighting would expose a tie to gambling, long considered
the most serious transgression for a professional athlete because of its
substantial undermining effect on the integrity of the game.153 Thus, at the
example, the late former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens was indicted on corruption charges. He pressed
for a quick trial in the hopes of obtaining an acquittal prior to the 2008 general election and eschewed
the long-standing conventional wisdom concerning whether to testify. He testified at his criminal
trial, looked foolish, and was convicted. His conviction was later vacated on unrelated prosecutorial
misconduct grounds, although, in fairness, the haste in which the prosecutors were forced to present
the case may have contributed to their ethical lapses that ultimately doomed the prosecution. For an
overview of the prosecutorial missteps in the Stevens case, see Anna Stolley Perskey, A Cautionary
Tale: The Ted Stevens Prosecution, WASH. LAWYER, Oct. 2009, at 18. On the other hand,
egomaniacal former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich publicly professed his innocence after his
indictment on corruption and related charges concerning, inter alia, an alleged scheme to sell
President Obama‘s former senate seat. He appeared as a contestant on ―‗Celebrity Apprentice,‖ and
during his opening statement of his federal public corruption trial, his counsel ―guaranteed‖ he would
testify. However, with his electoral career seemingly over in any event, sound defense strategy
prevailed, and the defense rested without calling any witnesses. Defense counsel said they were
―divided on the wisdom of their client testifying.‖ Peter Slevin, After Vowing to Testify, Blagojevich
Chooses Silence, WASH. POST, July 22, 2010, at A4. After seven weeks of testimony and two weeks
of deliberations, Blagojevich was convicted on one lone count, and the jury was deadlocked on the
other twenty-three counts. See Jerry Markon & Carol D. Leonnig, Blagojevich is Convicted on Just 1
of Count of 24, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2010, at A1. Keeping in character, Blagojevich celebrated the
verdict, asserted his innocence, and did not rule out future runs for political office. Blagojevich Won‟t
Rule Out Return to Politics, NPR.ORG, Aug. 22, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=129361520.
A somewhat similar issue also arises in so-called ―Upjohn‖ corporate settings, where an
employee is called in to discuss matters with corporate counsel and the employee is advised that if he
does not cooperate he will be fired and, if he does cooperate, his statements may be disclosed to law
enforcement. See David M Brodsky et al., Recommended Practices for Companies and Their
Counsel in Conducting Internal Investigations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 95 n.67 (2009). Of course,
in the context of a personal conduct investigation, the focus is not some generalized omnibus
corporate inquiry where there is no suspicion of a particular employee; the athlete is the specific
target or object of identifiable alleged misconduct that is the sole focus of the investigation.
153. The focus on gambling as detrimental to the best interests of the sport goes back at least to
the ―Black Sox‖ scandal during the 1919 World Series, where gamblers allegedly bribed players to
throw the World Series. The scandal, in turn, led to the creation of the modern office of the baseball
commissioner. See generally Janine Young Kim & Matthew J. Parlow, Off Court Misbehavior:
Sports Leagues and Private Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573, 575 (2009). Other
notorious cases abound. Baseball‘s all-time hit leader, Pete Rose, was banned from baseball for life
for gambling on baseball games while he was a manager, which has spawned substantial controversy
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outset, Vick feared far more serious punishment from the football
commissioner for involvement in gambling than he did from the legal system
for dogfighting.154 This adversely affected his strategic decisions.
The severe punishments meted out by the commissioners of the major
sports to athletes for violations of the respective ―personal conduct‖ policies
represent a relatively new and vitally important development in the
representation of professional athletes in trouble with the law. Professors
Janine Young Kim and Matthew Parlow note
[i]n 2007, the NFL implemented its new Personal Conduct
Policy . . . . [The policy]requires that ―[a]ll persons associated
with the NFL,‖ including the players, ―avoid ‗conduct
detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the
National Football League.‘‖ An athlete can be punished for
such detrimental conduct, even if his actions do not result in a
criminal conviction. This approach is in stark contrast to the
NFL‘s previous conduct policy, which required the NFL . . .
to withhold punishment of an athlete unless there was a
conviction or some form of plea by the athlete.155
In Major League Baseball, as illustrated by the recent Barry Bonds perjury
and kept Rose out of the Hall of Fame. In football, stars Alex Karras and Paul Hornung were
suspended for the 1963 season for gambling on NFL games. See Jeff Merron, Top 10 Suspensions of
All-Time, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/page2/s/list/suspensions.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
Joe Namath was forced to briefly retire in 1969 when NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle demanded
that Namath divest himself of an interest in Bachelors III Nightclub in New York, which was thought
to be an establishment frequented by known gamblers and underworld figures. Gary Ronberg, To Be
a Good Joe, It Takes a Hard Sell, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 28, 1969, at 18–19. The present NFL
policy on gambling is part of the current NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement. NAT‘L FOOTBALL
LEAGUE, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, app. C, sec. 15 (2006).
(―Integrity of Game‖ provision, which gives commissioner authority to suspend a player who
―knowingly associates with gamblers or gambling activity‖).
154. Vick was not alone in making that assessment. For example, during the early part of the
2009–10 season, National Basketball Association (NBA) star Gilbert Arenas brought weapons into
the team locker room in Washington, DC, in violation of both NBA rules and local firearms laws. At
first, Arenas did not seem particularly concerned about criminal prosecution and mocked the process
by pretending to shoot his teammates with his fingers in a pre-game warm-up. A color picture on the
front page of the Washington Post sports section captured a smiling Arenas ―shooting‖ his laughing
teammates. See Michael Lee, Personal Foul; Arenas Pretends to Shoot Teammates Before 104-97
Win Over 76ers, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2010, at D1. Arenas indicated he felt no remorse because he
did nothing wrong, and in response to a direct question about whether he feared the NBA
Commissioner David Stern more than the law, he noted that ―Stern is mean‖ and suggested that Stern
would succumb to pressure and punish him before the legal process played out, effectively indicating
he feared Stern more than the judicial process. Id.
155. Kim & Parlow, supra note 153, at 577–78 (emphasis added).
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case, the Bay Area Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO) steroids
investigation,156 and the Mitchell Report, which was compiled under the
auspices of the commissioner, it is well settled that information obtained by or
provided to the commissioner‘s office is subject to criminal subpoena or
search warrant and, thus, may be used in subsequent criminal investigations
and prosecutions.157 In professional football, NFL Commissioner Goodell
seems to generally prefer to wait until criminal charges are ―resolved‖ prior to
seeking a meeting with a player or imposing punishment pursuant to the new
Personal Conduct Policy (although nothing in the policy requires this).158
This creates an interesting situation concerning the legal avenues available to a
prosecutor to obtain information from the NFL commissioner.
These ―meetings‖ with the Commissioner are problematic—and are
certainly more risky than previously considered. These meetings may be
deemed ―private,‖ ―closed door,‖ or even ―confidential‖ in the colloquial
sense, but they are not privileged under federal evidence law. In personal
conduct investigations, the commissioner expects full cooperation, which
generally means full disclosure. An athlete who declines to talk out of self-

156. For a thorough account of the steroids scandal in Major League Baseball, see MARK
FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS (2007).
157. In the BALCO case, which led to Bonds federal perjury indictment, the government seized,
pursuant to a search warrant, various drug test results that were, according to an agreement between
baseball and the players union, supposed to be remain anonymous and should have been destroyed
prior to the time the government executed a criminal search warrant. The Ninth Circuit ultimately
ruled the government‘s seizure of the information was lawful. United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc. 473 F.3d 915, 920–24 (9th Cir. 2006). A subsequent en banc opinion limited the
government‘s use of some of the evidence but left undisturbed the ruling concerning the lawfulness of
the search for test results for which probable cause had been established. See generally United States
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
As a result of the steroids fiasco in baseball, the commissioner authorized former Senator
George Mitchell to investigate and issue a REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF AN INDEPENDENT
INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING
SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (2007) [hereinafter MITCHELL REPORT]. In
a memorandum attachment, MLB Player Association leader Donald Fehr cautioned players that any
information gathered by Mitchell was not legally privileged and Mitchell‘s pledge to honor
confidentiality in the report was not to be confused with the legal reality that Mitchell would not, and
could not, pledge the information will actually remain confidential. Id., app. at C-9-10. In particular,
the information would be subject to disclosure pursuant to a valid criminal subpoena. Id. Not
surprisingly, several players refused to cooperate, often citing as reason for their refusal the
possibility of a criminal investigation. See id. at 121.
158. Goodell suspended Vick immediately after the terms of the federal plea agreement
containing his admissions were disclosed but well before state charges were filed. Goodell arranged a
meeting with Pittsburgh Steelers quarterback Ben Roethlisberger one day after the local Georgia
district attorney determined there was insufficient evidence to press sexual assault charges.
Interestingly, Roethlisberger declined to be interviewed by Georgia authorities as part of the criminal
investigation.
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incrimination concerns can expect the commissioner to deem such actions
uncooperative, rendering the possibility that any suspension imposed would be
subsequently reduced unlikely.159
The professional sports leagues are private entities.
As such,
constitutional due process protections are not applicable to their conduct,
although the athletes may receive some procedural protections as a result of
the collective bargaining process.160 Uniform procedures are often lacking.
The leagues possess internal security personnel to investigate matters relating
to on-field issues but generally do not have formal private investigative forces
to investigate off-field incidents such as sexual assault, domestic violence, or
DUI allegations as a matter of course.161 Thus, the leagues are heavily
dependent on the media, Internet postings, and public records to provide the
factual impetus to trigger the scrutiny of the league to determine whether a
―personal conduct‖ violation has occurred.162

159. Suspension reductions are common when the commissioner deems the player has
sufficiently cooperated and acted responsibly. This is the overriding motivation for the player to
provide full cooperation. Notably, both Vick and Ben Roethlisberger had their six-game suspensions
ultimately reduced to two and four games, respectively. In the context of a sixteen-game season,
every game is crucial.
The Brett Favre-Jenn Sterger controversy is also noteworthy. Favre faced a league
investigation based on allegedly sending inappropriate text messages and photographs of a sexual
nature. Although he did not appear to be under criminal investigation in any jurisdiction, he faced
potential civil liability. Favre apparently recognized that ―cooperation‖ with the commissioner could
result in serious adverse legal consequences and, thus, declined to fully cooperate. Favre was
ultimately fined $50,000 for ―lack of candor and failure to cooperate with a league investigation.‖
See Judy Battista, Favre Fined $50,000 But Avoids Suspension, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2010, at B10.
160. For a scathing critique on the NFLPA‘s acquiescence to the 2007 Personal Conduct Policy,
see Adam Marks, Note, Personnel Foul on the National Football League Players Association: How
Union Executive Director Gene Upshaw Failed the Union‟s Members By Not Fighting the Enactment
of the Personal Conduct Policy, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1581 (2008). In any event, collective
bargaining protections may not be as helpful as they once were. For example, MLB long ignored the
steroid problem by telling Congress and the public that it could not unilaterally adopt a tougher
enforcement policy because of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Congress held high
profile public hearings, essentially telling baseball to clean up its act or Congress would enact
legislation on the subject. See MITCHELL REPORT, supra note 157, at 56 (quoting Sen. John McCain
at a 2004 hearing threatening congressional action).
161. Perhaps this is for good reason. For example, in 1990, the late New York Yankees owner
George Steinbrenner was banned from baseball for life when he hired a gambler to obtain damaging
information on Yankees star Dave Winfield. When Steinbrenner was reinstated in the spring of 1993,
he appeared on the cover of Sports Illustrated posing as Napoleon. George II: George Steinbrenner
Rides Back Into Baseball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (cover photo), March 1, 1993.
162. In Vick‘s case, Commissioner Goodell simply had to review the public documents and
Vick‘s admissions in the plea agreement. For Roethlisberger, a sexual assault suspect involving
college coeds, the first time a suspension was imposed without a criminal conviction, Goodell issued
a public statement indicating he had reviewed ―extensive volume of material released by [law
enforcement authorities]; public comments by . . . [the prosecutor]; . . . a personal interview with
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The athlete cannot invoke the privilege against self-incrimination without
consequence.163 As with baseball, any statements made to the commissioner,
or any other evidence in the possession of the commissioner, can be obtained
by the government with a search warrant or otherwise be compelled to be
divulged via grand jury subpoena and, thus, may be used against the athlete in
a subsequent criminal prosecution.164 This now poses an increased concern
because a prosecutorial decision not to pursue criminal charges—which would
normally precede any personal conduct investigation based on conduct that did
not result in a conviction—is rarely, if ever, an irrevocable legal decision.
The pre-2007 state of affairs may have been far too lax in that the NFL did
not act until the criminal process was complete and resulted in a conviction
and then often imposed little, if any, serious punishment, fine, suspension, or
other form of discipline.165 However, from a criminal justice fairness
standpoint, this inadequate simplicity had a virtue. Because the criminal

Roethlisberger . . . ; and information learned by the NFL office in the course of examining the . . .
matter.‖ Ben Roethlisberger Suspension: Suspended Six Games, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/04/21/ben-roethlisberger-suspen_n_546097.html (Apr. 21, 2010, 11:32 EST, updated June 21,
2010, 5:12 EST).
163. In other words, an athlete can refuse to answer the commissioner‘s questions or can refuse
to attend a meeting altogether, but both actions may be used by the commissioner as negative
evidence against the athlete, and lack of full cooperation itself may be grounds for disciplinary action.
Several baseball players declined to cooperate with the Mitchell Report, citing the ongoing federal
criminal investigation and related self-incrimination concerns. See MITCHELL REPORT, supra note
157, at 127. However, the Mitchell Report was focused on determining the extent of drug use in
baseball; it was not focused on the actions of particular players in the context of a disciplinary
investigation. Accordingly, baseball took no adverse action against those players who declined to
cooperate because of self-incrimination concerns. The situation is, of course, markedly different if a
player who is the subject of a personal conduct investigation declines to fully cooperate with the
commissioner.
164. See discussion supra pp. 509-10 and note 157. In the criminal prosecutions as part of the
BALCO investigations and illegal steroid distribution, despite these ―private confidentiality clauses‖
between the players and MLB, the test results were not destroyed as agreed to and were ultimately
obtained by federal prosecutors as a result of a search warrant. In the same vein, the NFL
commissioner would be legally compelled to testify concerning any statement made by him to an
athlete as part of a league‘s good conduct inquiry, whether he wanted to or not and whether or not the
athlete consented to such disclosure.
As this article goes to press, Roger Clemens‘ federal perjury case is moving toward trial.
Clemens‘ counsel has indicated he will seek to subpoena various information gathered as part of the
Mitchell Report. Already Eager to Defend Himself in Court, Clemens Speaks Out, WASH. POST, Mar.
31, 2011, at D8.
165. Former NFL player Leonard Little was convicted of involuntary manslaughter arising out of
a 1998 incident when he killed a woman when he ran a red light while driving while intoxicated. He
received a lenient criminal sentence and was permitted to resume his football career after serving an
eight-game suspension. Josie Karp, Deadly Reminder: Rams Linebacker Little Coping With Fatal
Past, CNNSI.COM., Jan. 28, 2000, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/thenetwork/news/2000/01/27/
cnnsicomprofile_little/.
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prosecution phase was complete and had resulted in conviction,166 the athlete
did not have to fear being whipsawed into cooperating with the commissioner
and incriminating himself in an effort to provide ―full cooperation‖ to facilitate
an eventual reduction of any suspension where a prosecutor would then be
able to obtain the incriminating information for subsequent use in a criminal
prosecution. This possibility now exists.
As noted above, although the new NFL policy does not require a prior
conviction, a favorable criminal law ―resolution‖ in the form of a decision by
the prosecutor not to pursue charges is virtually never, legally, a final decision.
That decision—like the state prosecutor‘s initial decision in Vick‘s case not to
pursue a state case—can almost always be revisited, thus making the player‘s
statements obtained by the commissioner available for use in a criminal
prosecution if the prosecutor decides to revisit the issue and bring charges
even after having initially decided not to do so.
The possibility that this scenario may occur must be recognized,
particularly because the prosecutor now might be able to mine a new potential
treasure trove of evidence—the suspect‘s direct statements gathered by the
commissioner.167 To a publicity-hungry prosecutor, the temptation to mine

166. Countless athletes have faced criminal prosecution for narcotics offenses. See MITCHELL
REPORT, supra note 157, at SR-14-15. Drug and weapons charges are disturbingly common
occurrences for professional athletes. See NAT‘L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS‘N, PERSONAL
CONDUCT POLICY 1 (2008), available at http://www.prostaronline.com/personal_conduct_policy.pdf
(noting that discipline may be imposed for, inter alia, unlawful possession of a gun and offenses
relating to prohibited substances and substances of abuse). These offenses are also subject to
prosecution under both state and federal law. Thus, even before the advent of the new policy, similar
timing access to commissioner information issues, could have arisen but never did. There was little
need to rely on commissioner-obtained information when there was already a public record of
conviction. Equally as significant, no athlete prior to Vick faced both state and federal prosecution
for the same underlying conduct. This further underscores the unfair treatment of Vick.
167. Significantly, this is often crucial evidence, particularly in investigations where the
suspect‘s intent is the central issue in the case, and the type most often lacking as part of a criminal
investigation where the suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment rights or otherwise declines to
cooperate with law enforcement. This is why law enforcement places such a premium on obtaining a
confession and, conversely, why many investigations ultimately do not result in criminal charges.
The point is well understood in the related trial context where guilt must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Glanville Williams, The “Right of Silence” and the Mental Element, 1988
CRIM. L. REV. 97, 102 (―by not testifying and yet denying the mental element, the defendant can
often present the tribunal . . . with an insoluble problem‖). Therefore, prosecutors and criminal
investigators who initially had to forgo prosecution because the suspect would not talk or otherwise
provide any information will be naturally quite interested in reviewing any subsequent statements
made by the suspect that might be of sufficient significance to reverse the original declination
decision. See generally Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 6 (1986) (noting the
Supreme Court‘s position that ―[a]dmissions of guilt are more than merely ‗desirable,‘ . . . they are
essential to society‘s compelling interest‖ in fair and effective law enforcement) (citations omitted).
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this potentially powerful dispositive evidence may be irresistible. Thus, it is
only a matter of time before a prosecutor who previously decided not to pursue
charges changes his mind and seeks evidence from the commissioner through
the criminal process.
This undoubtedly would constitute an unintended consequence. The NFL
commissioner, acting unilaterally in devising the new, supposedly enlightened,
policy to cover conduct that did not necessarily result in a prior criminal
conviction, almost certainly did not envision this scenario whereby he could
become a critical conduit in providing the key information to resurrect a
criminal prosecution that had previously been declined. The first time a
criminal subpoena arrives at the league offices, the NFL will have to consider
whether to revisit or otherwise ―tweak‖ this policy.
At present, the current state of affairs remains problematic. While the
contours of the future are beginning to take shape, the form is quite hazy.
Clearly, focusing solely on how best to defend the criminal charges is not
sufficient, but no new coherent model has emerged. This creates a difficult
situation when other considerations must now be factored into the equation as
to how to most effectively defend criminal charges, possible civil claims, deal
with a commissioner‘s personal conduct investigation, or all of them.
Proceeding case-by-case under a trial-and-error method yields many
casualties. A difficult road lies ahead.168

168. For a discussion of other potential problems with the NFL Personal Conduct Policy, see
Bethany Withers, Note, The Integrity of the Game: Professional Athletes and Domestic Violence, 1
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 174–76 (2010) (noting examples where players have been
disciplined by the league and subsequently been found not guilty of criminal charges).
Lastly, Vick‘s case also exposes another unavoidable risk in these situations. Perhaps there
was an earlier time when powerful defendants could expect loyalty and silence from underlings who
would not testify against them under any circumstances. The old Mafia code of ―omerta‖ was in play.
See LETIZIA PAOLI, MAFIA BROTHERHOODS: ORGANIZED CRIME, ITALIAN STYLE 109 (2003)
(―omerta‖ is described as popular southern Italian code of silence that implies ―the categorical
prohibition of cooperation with state authorities‖). ―Omerta‖ is graphically illustrated in one of the
opening scenes in Goodfellas when a young Henry Hill is ―pinched‖ for the first time, is sent to
reform school, and, upon his release, is the guest of honor at a Mafia party celebrating his adherence
to the cardinal rule of not ―ratting out‖ anyone. GOODFELLAS (Warner Bros. 1990). It is also more
ominously on display in Godfather II when Frank Pentangeli ultimately refuses to testify against
Michael Corleone at a Senate Investigating Committee and thereafter commits suicide after getting
assurances regarding the safety and well-being of his family. GODFATHER II (Paramount Pictures
1974).
Vick, by lying about his involvement in dogfighting and related gambling, even after some
of his criminal companions had already been arrested, obviously thought that ―home boy‖ superstar
loyalty would protect him and that his confederates would not implicate him. Vick was wrong, and
his lack of candor—once exposed—contributed to an even harsher sentence.
The code of ―omerta‖ no longer protects Mafia dons and, except perhaps for Barry Bonds,
see supra note 27 and accompanying text, should not be expected to protect star athletes. Federal
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CONCLUSION
Michael Vick‘s depraved conduct was deserving of punishment.
However, the actual criminal prosecutions he faced were collectively
excessive and questionable exercises of prosecutorial discretion. Vick should
have been prosecuted solely by state authorities. Vick‘s own conduct, which
made this most appropriate outcome problematic, does not eliminate the
importance of critically evaluating the manner in which these prosecutions
unfolded.
The avalanche of publicity generated by these prosecutions has not
translated into any significant change concerning how society values dogs.
Moreover, Vick‘s high-profile dogfighting federal prosecution does not appear
to have elevated dogfighting as a substantial federal prosecutorial priority.
The prosecution has served as an impetus for several states to strengthen and
increase the severity of punishment for local dogfighting offenses as well as
increase the number of local prosecutions. These legal developments are for
the good and reflect a reasonable and responsible allocation of law
enforcement responsibility in our federalism system.
Other aspects of Vick‘s case remain troubling and perplexing. Both state
and federal prosecutors exercised questionable, if not abusive, discretion.
Vick received an unduly harsh federal sentence, a result likely facilitated, at
least in part, by weird, if not bad, legal advice. No steps were taken to protect
Vick from an avoidable and likely improper subsequent state prosecution that
resulted in an additional felony conviction and an extra year of probation
supervision.
It could have been much worse. Vick was fortunate to gain admission into
a halfway house near the end of his sentence by removing the obstacle of
unresolved pending charges without an increase in actual prison time.
However, viewed in its entirety, he did not avoid the lurking pitfalls of
successive prosecutions and paid quite a heavy price for his failure to do so.
One ignores these lessons at considerable peril. It is of little consequence
that successive prosecutions are relatively uncommon. As Congress continues
to enact more and more federal criminal statutes, which overlap with existing
state criminal statutes, successive prosecutions will inevitably occur with
greater frequency. Therefore
criminal law has too many powerful inducements—law enforcement has long used plea bargains,
lenient sentencing recommendations, and federal witness protection to obtain the testimony of
underlings or lesser lights to implicate the higher-ups in organized criminal activity. In evaluating the
new calculus of potential criminal prosecution and discipline from the commissioners‘ offices, only in
the rarest of circumstances should a professional athlete expect that others will keep silent and risk
punishment themselves in order to protect a superstar.
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[i]t is important to understand that the significance of the
prospect of a successive or dual prosecution far exceeds the
mere number of such prosecutions. The federal government
authorizes approximately 150 successive prosecutions each
year. The number of successive prosecutions undertaken by
the various states clearly far exceeds that number, but relative
to all state prosecutions, is still quite small. The legal
possibility that these prosecutions may be brought hangs over
the head of every defendant. Consequently, the possibility of
a successive prosecution based on the same conduct
influences plea bargains, cooperation agreements, immunity
agreements, and other related issues concerning the
disposition of a case.169
Again, Vick navigated this difficult legal landscape and did not come out
unscathed.
Lastly, Vick‘s case foreshadows a new dimension as well—the quagmire
that athletes now face concerning the possible use of evidence obtained by the
commissioner for use in a subsequent criminal or civil investigation—and
reveals the contours of an uncertain future that is only beginning to take shape.
Professional athletes can no longer rely on a predictable order of investigations
as they to try to run the gauntlet between criminal prosecution and possible
league discipline. The new NFL Personal Conduct Policy permits league
discipline without a prior adjudication of criminal guilt. Grandstanding
prosecutors, who were evident in Vick‘s case, may be tempted to revisit earlier
non-binding prosecution declination decisions and could seek to obtain
information from the league investigation that was generated after the initial
declination decision.
Only time will tell how often prosecutors will seek to mine this heretofore
unavailable source of potentially incriminating information. Many might find
the temptation irresistible. This may eventually eclipse the dogfighting angle
and emerge as the most important legal legacy of this case. In all likelihood,
the NFL did not adopt its new policy with this scenario in mind. If this
becomes a recurring issue, the league may have to revisit this policy.
Meanwhile, the larger policy debate concerning the appropriate
169. KURLAND, supra note 62, at xxiv–xxv. A leading federal criminal law text makes a similar
observation that 150 such prosecutions annually may seem a ―rare‖ occurrence when compared to the
approximately 65,000 federal prosecutions each year, but ―rarity‖ is a relative notion. In an absolute
sense, 150 policy exceptions still could be considered ―frequent.‖ See NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA SUN
BEALE & SUSAN RIVA KLEIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 106–07 (5th ed.
2010).
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relationship between state and federal law enforcement continues in fits and
starts. And the lurking pitfalls of successive prosecutions, now further
amplified by a third pillar—the possibility of investigation and punishment
from the league commissioner—will continue to vex the fair administration of
criminal justice. Vick‘s case has begun to reshape this criminal law landscape.
Future cases, where different decisions are made when athletes are confronted
with similar concerns, will further define this uncertain legal terrain.

